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1. INTRODUCTION

Even before homesteaders or Mormon settlement took hold in the
high valleys and plains of the Rockies, a "right to float" in the intermountain
west was born and has taken on various meanings since. 2 From John Wesley
Powell's groundbreaking expedition down the Green and Colorado Rivers to
the establishment of modem day whitewater guiding services and fishing
expeditions, the right to float has maintained a place in the West's outdoor
culture and reputation. Although more people than ever are being drawn to
1.
The author would like to acknowledge the help of Wyoming Professor Reed Benson
for his valuable suggestions and insight at various stages of the project.
2.
FRANK WATERS, THE COLORADO 98 (Swallow Press/Ohio University Press ed. 1985)
(1974). Highways and trade routes on the Colorado River can be traced back to seashell and
parrot feather trade within the ancient Puebloen civilization, including the Paiutes, Mojaves,
Yumas, and Cocopah tribes. Id.
3.

JOHN WESLEY POWELL, SEEING THINGS WHOLE 61-89 (William deBuys ed., Island

Press 2001) (chronicling John Wesley Powell's legendary expedition down the Colorado
River in 1869). See also Stephen D. Osborne et al., Laws Governing RecreationalAccess to
Waters of the Columbia Basin: A Survey and Analysis, 33 ENVTL. L. 399, 400 (2003) (describing floating down a stream as the "archetypal American experience of freedom").
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our rivers for recreation, this commonly held public privilege is being threatened by an increase in ownership of riparian lands.' While the popularity of
recreational floating has persisted and even grown in the new millennium,
traditional legal notions of private property have challenged the modem day
river runner's right to float.'
Owners of private property with interests to appurtenant rivers and
streams have claimed a right to block access to floaters. Out of the concern
that the growth of recreational water uses leads to increased traffic, trespass,
litter, and vandalism of private land, landowners have reacted with barbed
wire and "No Trespassing" signs. In many instances landowners have taken
drastic measures in order to keep recreationalists at bay. Aggravated ranchers, armed with shotguns, feud with boaters over barbed wire fences in Colorado's Cheeseman Canyon.7 In Montana, Rock star Huey Lewis made the
news as anglers lined up outside his property around his blockade on the
Bitteroot River.' Such incidents are specifically tied to a misunderstanding
of access law. More importantly, these incidents are provoked by a greater
social conflict over property rights.9
In modem times, society has struggled perhaps more than ever over
the definition of the public domain in the context of both land and water
resources. The conflict as it applies to water resources has surfaced in two
major areas of debate: instream water rights and public access rights. Both
developed around the same time, but each uniquely addresses the greater
public domain question.1" Debate over instream water rights involves the
public's right to quantities of water and has evolved out of the environmental

4.
See John R. Hill, Jr., The "Right" to Float Through PrivateProperty in Colorado:
Dispelling the Myth, 4 U. DENY. WATER L. REv. 331, 332 (2001) (discussing the growth of
recreational floating on rivers like the Colorado and Arkansas as well as opposition from
riparian landowners).
5.
Id.
6.
Osborne, supra note 3, at 400 (discussing the conflict between private landowners
and recreational river users in the Northwest). See also Brian Morris, Comment, When Rivers
Run Dry Under a Big Sky: Balancing Agriculturaland Recreational Claims to Scarce Water
Resources in Montana and the American West, 11 STAN.ENvTL. L.J. 259, 266 (1992) (describing the historical events leading up to Montana's law on recreational access).
Telephone interview with Shane Sigel, former U.S. Kayak team member (February
7.
12, 2004). In the spring of 2000 Shane and other boaters were confronted by an armed landowner on the Cheeseman Canyon section of the South Platte River in Colorado. Id. After the
boaters got through a man made obstruction that blocked the river, a County Sheriff was
waiting for them at the take-out of the river run. Id.
8.
Anglers Protest Huey Lewis Stream Closure, THE MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 4, 2004,
available at http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/entertainment/6453206.htm (last visited
Apr. 25, 2005).
9.
See Osborne, supra note 3, at 445 for a discussion of the underlying conflicts between
private landowners and recreational river users.
10.
See Morris, supra note 6, at 259-63 for a discussion of the relationship between instream flow and stream access laws in Montana.
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concern for keeping more water in lakes and rivers." In contrast, the public
access debate centers on how the public may exercise its right to the use and
enjoyment of water."2
This comment will address the public access issue in an attempt to
address how society has reconciled private versus public rights to access
waterways in the intermountain west.' 3 In the intermountain west, the states
of Colorado, Wyoming, New Mexico, Montana, Utah, and Idaho have all
afforded some level of protection for the public to access their waterways.14
However, the levels of protection afforded by these states vary greatly from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. This comment will reveal the legal underpinnings behind the different states' access rules and evaluate which are best
grounded in contemporary law. Finally, this comment will evaluate the rules
in place from a policy standpoint in order to suggest ways in which to improve the status quo.
An evaluation of both policy and law is especially relevant today,
since debate over stream access law in the intermountain states continues to
be a hot topic in need of resolution.' 5 The debate is particularly active in
Wyoming where a bill on recreational access was recently defeated by a slim
margin in the beginning of 2005.6 The proposed House Bill would have
permitted recreationalists to drop an anchor or touch a river bottom while
11.
DAVID M. GILLILAN & THOMAS C. BROWN, INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION: SEEKING A
BALANcE IN WESTERN WATER USE 43 (Island Press 1997) (describing how changing societal
demands for improved environmental quality and recreation opportunities spawned changes
in law to keep more water in rivers and streams).
12.
See infra notes 308-11 and accompanying text for discussion of the policy behind
recreational access law.
13.
Because of these unique differences between the two areas of debate, this comment
will examine the issue of public access without extensive discussion of the appropriation
question. Although many of the applicable laws require isolating the access and appropriation issues, it is nonetheless important to note that at a practical level the two issues are not so
inseparable. Both issues interrelate in forming the greater societal policy governing how the
public domain applies to water resources.
14.
Lori Potter et al., Legal Underpinnings of the Right to Float Through PrivateProperty in Colorado:A Reply to John Hill, 5 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 457, 498 (Spring 2002)
(explaining a right of public access is recognized in Wyoming, New Mexico, Utah, Montana,
and Idaho).
15.
See infra notes 225-26 and accompanying text for discussion of how the ambiguities
found in Colorado access law has prompted misunderstanding and a number of claims
brought in state courts in order to clarify gray areas of law. See also infra notes 16-18 and
accompanying text for a discussion of pending legislation in Wyoming.
16.
See Equality State Policy Center, The Wyoming Legislative Accountability Project
Book (2005 Session), available at http://www.equalitystate.orgilapbook/05legislation/hb088_05.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2005) ("Supporters of HB 88 noted that Wyoming's
current trespass laws place a uniquely high burden on sportsmen and recreationalists, and
characterized the restrictions on boaters as completely unreasonable. They pointed out that
anglers sometimes need to anchor their boats to land fish, fish a reach of stream, or to perform
basic safety functions."). House Bill 88 was defeated by a five to four vote in the Wyoming
House Travel, Recreation, Wildlife, and Cultural Resources Committee in 2005. Id.
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fishing and boating on state waterways.17 Similar bills, expanding upon
Wyoming's stream recreation laws, were also defeated in 2004. I" Due to the
latest narrow defeat in 2005 and prior attempts to revise access laws, the
issue over recreational access rights in Wyoming will most likely be around
for some time. This comment will attempt to provide guidance for lawmakers in Wyoming and other intermountain states, who will inevitably decide
how we use our waterways when public and private interests clash.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Privateversus Public Conflict
The modem conflict between recreational public rights and private
riparian rights to surface waters is tied to older legal doctrines, established in
early U.S. case law and English common law.19 Many of our nation's rivers
and streams have been recognized as public resources through navigability
law, the authority of State constitutions, and the public trust doctrine. In this
order, the background section of this comment will summarize these three
sources of the public right to water resources and then trace the origins of the
private land owner's right to exclusion. Once the principles of the private
versus public conflict are established, the background section of this comment will conclude with an overview of the access laws in place in the Intermountain West.
Federal navigability law is one of the older legal concepts in the
United States, the origins of which can be traced back to early Roman law.2"
The legal concept of navigability was later passed on to English common
law, which held such waters to be under the dominion of the Crown.2 In the
1800s the federal government granted states sovereignty over all navigable
waters and associated beds and banks under the equal footing doctrine.22
Title to navigable waterways was vested with the states under the condition
that subsequent grants could not impair the public interest. 23 In effect, the
17.
Id.
18.
See Wyoming Conservation Voters, 2004 Legislative Voter Guide (House District 44
- Cheyenne), available at http://www.wyovoters.org/Publications/04VoterGuides/HD44%202004%20Primary%20Voter/o2OGuide.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2005).
19.
See infra notes 20-105 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of how
U.S. case law and English common law have bolstered the legal rights associated with recreational pubic rights and private riparian rights.
20.
Glenn J. MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law: Historical Development, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines That Don't Hold Water, 3
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 513, 605-10 (1975).
21.
Id.
22.
See Hill, supra note 4, at 340. The equal footing doctrine gives new states jurisdictional authority equal to the original thirteen colonies. See Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S.
212 (1845) (establishing the equal footing doctrine).
23.
See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). In Illinois Central
the U.S. Supreme Court denied the Illinois legislature's grant of submerged lands in Lake
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federally granted waterways created a public trust through state ownership.24
Furthermore, privately held interests in navigable waters are subject to a
federal navigational servitude, which requires no equitable compensation to
private land owners.25 The navigational servitude, created by the federal
common law test, derives its authority through the commerce clause. 6 In
order for rivers or streams to meet the common law test for navigability, they
must be shown to be "[s]usceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce. 27 Many commentators also refer to the
above test as the Daniel Ball or navigability for title test.2
For the purpose of determining the title to underlying beds and
banks of a river, federal navigability has been a topic of much confusion for
scholars and courts.29 Depending upon the context, the meaning of "navigability" can create a variety of legal results." For example, a determination
that a waterway is navigable for title by the common law test has much
broader legal implications than a determination of navigability under the
U.S. Corps of Engineers' definition. Navigability under the common law
test can establish title for a waterway's underlying beds and banks, in effect
creating a near perfect public servitude." By contrast, the U.S. Army Corps

Michigan to a railroad company. Id. The legislative grant was said to contravene the public's
interest in fishing and claiming the shoreline lake beds. Id at 436.
24.
Id.
25.
See Potter, supra note 14, at 464 for an analysis of the federal navigational servitude
and its implications on public access rights.
26.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, el. 3. The commerce clause gives Congress the exclusive
power to regulate commerce among the states.
Id in Illinois Central, "regulation of commerce" was found to include Congress' right to control their navigation. Illinois Central, 146
U.S. at 435-59.
27.
Steamer Daniel Ball v. United States, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870) (holding the limited
English common law definition of "navigability," which only covered waterways influenced
by the ebbs and flows of tides, was inadequate in the United States and therefore needed to be
expanded in modem times to also cover major inland water courses used for interstate and
foreign commerce).
28.
See, e.g., Potter, supra note 14, at 461 for a description of the nomenclature of various
types of federal navigability. See also Jennie L. Bricker, Navigability and Public Use, 38
WILLAMETrE L. REV. 93, 96 (2001).
29.
See generally Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). The majority
opinion delivered by Justice Rehnquist and dissent delivered by Justice Blackmun disagreed
on the legal significance behind the Army Corps' navigability test and federal common law
tests. Id. See also Potter, supra note 14, at 461.
30.
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(B) (2004). This provision triggers federal authority
under the Clean Water Act when a discharge of a pollutant occurs on a navigable waters. Id.
The Clean Water Act defines "navigable waters" liberally, defining said waters as all waters
of the United States, including the territorial seas. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2004).
31.
See Osborne, supra note 3, at 404 for a description of the common law test for federal
navigability.
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of Engineers' test for navigability determines the jurisdictional reach of
Corps, but not the legal title of the waterway for access purposes.32
The distinctions between various tests were made clear through the
seminal U.S. Supreme Court case, Kaiser Aetna v. United States, a case that
addressed the relationship between rights of access and navigability law.33
In Kaiser Aetna, the Corps of Engineers' navigational servitude on a bay in
Hawaii was challenged in the context of a Fifth Amendment takings claim
by a private owner.34 In a five-to-three decision, the majority held that the
government's attempt to create a public right of access could not be imposed
without paying the private owners just compensation.35
KaiserAetna involved a developer who leased Kuapa Pond from a
private owner in 1961 to develop a marina on the pond.36 In order to proceed with development of Kuapa pond, Kaiser Aetna dredged and filled
parts of the pond, erected walls and bridges, and increased the average depth
of the channel from two to six feet.37 Most notably, the owner opened up the
pond to the tides of the ocean through the installation of sluice gates, which
made a previously privately owned bay subject to federal navigability.38
In addressing the Fifth Amendment takings issue raised by Kaiser
Aetna, the Court determined what types navigability applied to Kuapa
pond.39 The Court found that the newly improved Kuapa pond met the definitional requirement of "navigability" under the Corp's test in section 10 of
the Rivers and Harbors Act, but not under the common law Daniel Ball test
to determine navigability for title purposes. 40 In many instances, distinctions
like these have proven crucial in determining the extent of a public right to
access where state law has nothing further to add.4

32.
See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 170-71 (drawing a distinction between the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers' test and the federal common law approach).
33.
Id at 168.
34.
Id. at 166-67.
35.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 166-67.
36.
Id. at 167.
37.
38.
Id at 179. The Court found that before improvements were made, Kuapa Pond was
private property under Hawaiian law and non-navigable for federal purpose. Id.
Potter, supra note 14, at 467 (describing how Kaiser Aetna made a distinction be39.
tween "navigability" for the purpose of extending power to regulate navigation and "navigability" for the purpose of a navigational servitude and associated public rights to access).
KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 172-73.
40.
41.
See, e.g., Boone v. United States 944 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir. 1991). Similar to Kaiser
Aetna, Boone involved a man-made lagoon in Hawaii, the owner of which expended funds to
convert a non-navigable littoral fishpond into a navigable waterway. Id. at 1491-92. The
Boone court drew a direct analogy to Kaiser Aetna, holding that although the pond was navigable for the purpose of extending regulatory authority to the Corps, it was nonetheless not
subject to a navigational servitude. Potter, supranote 14, at 469-70. Similar to Kuapa Pond,
the fishpond in Boone was incapable of use as a continuous highway for purpose of naviga-
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In other instances, waterways that do not pass the federal common
law test have nonetheless been defined as public resources by many state
governments." Absent federal preemption under the commerce clause,
states have been free to make their own navigability determinations of waters within their boundaries.13 At least forty-two jurisdictions have adopted
their own definitions of navigability in order to create public servitudes over
their waters." These state navigability determinations differ from the common law federal test in that they do not confer public title to the beds and
banks of a waterway.45 Nonetheless, state tests have had the same effect as
far as access is concerned and have effectively created a public servitude
over private land.46
Definitions for state navigability are less restrictive than the federal
test and in effect expand public ownership of waterways for the public interest. 47 Unlike the federal test, expanded state definitions are usually based on
something other than a waterway's ability to sustain commercial navigation." State navigability in the West includes everything from Michigan's
"saw log" test, asking whether a stream allows passage of logs toward a mill,

tion in its natural state. Potter, supra note 14, at 470. But see Loving v. Alexander, 548 F.
Supp. 1079 (W.D. Va. 1982). In Loving, riparian landowners sought a declaration that the
Jackson River in Virginia was non-navigable for the purpose of establishing a servitude for
public access. Id. at 1081-82. The court decided that although Jackson River in its natural
state could not support commercial floating, a navigational servitude existed by virtue of the
river's susceptibility to recreational canoeing and cold-water fishing. Id at 1085. In holding
that a non-compensable public servitude existed on the Jackson River, the court distinguished
Kaiser Aetna. Id. at 1089, 109 1. The court reasoned that unlike the pond in Kaiser Aetna,
Jackson River was not previously a non-navigable waterway made navigable by private expenditures. Id. at 1091. See also Atlanta Sch. of Kayaking, Inc. v. Douglasville-Douglas
County Water & Sewer Auth., 981 F. Supp. 1469, 1472-73 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (distinguishing
Kaiser Aetna based on reasons similar to Loving).
42.
See Osborne, supra note 3, at 403 (discussing the proposition that "title navigability
under federal law establishes the minimum number of waterways open to public access, but
typically not the maximum").
43.
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 230 (1845) (holding the new states have the
same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over this subject [beds and banks of navigable waterways] as the original states).
44.
See Potter, supra note 14, at 486 (noting the extent of state determinations of navigability for access purposes).
45.
See Potter, supra note 14, at 461-63, 492-93 (summarizing the affect on title that
federal and state navigability tests have on river beds and banks as well as their capacity to
create servitudes).
46.
See Potter, supra note 14, at 492-93 (describing the legal effect of state navigability
determinations).
See Osborne, supra note 3, at 409 (observing that states, in recognizing the limits of
47.
the federal navigability-for-title test, have adopted a broader test). For a more in-depth discussion on state navigation servitudes, see Daniel J. Morgan & David G. Lewis, The State
Navigation Servitude, 4 LAND & WATER L. REv. 521 (1969).
48.
DAviD GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 222-23 (West Publishing Co. 1997)
(1984).
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to California's "pleasure boat" test, asking whether a waterway is useful for
rafts, rowboats, or canoes.49
Access issues in the intermountain west typically revolve on state
determinations, since federal determinations usually do not apply to this
Although some commentators argue that the federal servitude
region."
should apply to waters of the intermountain west, courts have yet to apply
the federal servitude with any regularity." The waterways in the intermountain west simply run too dry and are not the sort of "[g]reat navigable stream
...[incapable] of private ownership" that Kaiser Aetna requires, but nonetheless may be of the type that satisfy state law. 2
The less restrictive state tests of navigability for servitude purposes
typically gain authority from state constitutions.53 For example, the constitutions in Wyoming and New Mexico both declare that state waters belong to
the public and the courts have unequivocally interpreted these declarations to
grant a public right of access through private land. 4 In both Wyoming and

49.
For Michigan's "saw log" test, see Grand Rapids Booming Co. v. Jarvis, 30 Mich.
308, 319 (1874). For California's "pleasure boat" test, see People v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d
1040 (1971).
50.
See Hill, supranote 4, at 344 (showing that despite several instances where the Corps
of Engineers has invoked federal jurisdiction on Colorado waterways, the Daniel Ball federal
test for navigability has never been applied by Colorado courts); Osborne, supra note 3, at
407-08 (generally demonstrating that court determinations of federal navigability have chiefly
been made on larger, commerce-heavy water bodies found among the coastal states of Washington, Oregon, and Alaska).
51.
See Potter, supra note 14, at 474 (laying out an argument for why the federal nivigational servitude should apply to many of Colorado's waters); See also Osborne, supra note 3,
at 409 (asserting that the modern federal navigable-for-title test is satisfied by evidence that
commercially guided whitewater float trips could have been supported by rivers upon statehood).
52.
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979) (citing U.S. v. ChandlerDunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69 (1913)). See also infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text
(describing the arid nature of the climates found in Montana and Colorado).
53.
See infra note 55 and accompanying text. State-imposed navigational servitudes are
an exercise of the state's police powers, deriving its authority from the implicitly reserved
power under the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Jessie H. Briggs,
Navigational Servitude as a Method of Ecological Protection, 75 DicK. L. REV. 256, 260
(1971).
54.
Wvo. CONST. art. VIII, § I ("The waters of all natural streams, springs, lakes or other
collections of still water, within the boundaries of the state, are hereby declared to be the
property of the state."). See. e.g., Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 143 (Wyo. 1961) (holding
the state constitution granted to the public a right to float on streams flowing through private
property). N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 2 ("The unappropriated water of every natural stream,
perennial or torrential, within the state of New Mexico, is hereby declared to belong to the
public and to be subject to appropriation for beneficial use, in accordance with the laws of the
state."). See, e.g., New Mexico v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421 (N.M. 1946) (interpreting Article 16, Section 2 to grant a public right to access public waters).
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New Mexico, state courts have granted a public right to access directly from
the granting language of their constitutions. 5
The New Mexico Supreme Court was perhaps one of the first courts
in the intermountain west to recognize the public's ownership and right to
use all waters in the state. 6 New Mexico v. Red River Valley Co. involved a
corporation that owned six hundred and fifty-five thousand acres of land
7
around and under the Conchas Dam Reservoir in San Miguel County.5 The
private land owner opposed the State Game Commission's request for a declaratory judgment to determine the waters of reservoir open to the public
for fishing and general recreational use. 8 In the end, the New Mexico Supreme Court decided in favor of the public's claim to access, holding that the
corporation's right to
waters in question were, and are, public waters and the
59
use the water are not distinct from that of the public's.
The court's holding followed a careful inspection of the meaning of
the New Mexico Constitution and the prior appropriation doctrine. The
court read in to the meaning of Article 16, Section 2 of the New Mexico
Constitution which provides, "[t]he unappropriated water of every natural
stream, perennial or torrential, within the state of New Mexico, is hereby
declared to belong to the public and to be subject to appropriation for beneficial use."6 The court unequivocally interpreted this provision to grant a
public right to access, regardless of whether or not it has been appropriated
in advance.6 1 The court rejected the theory that "[e]ven though these be public waters, subject to such appropriation, nevertheless, they cannot be used
by the public until appropriated by the public for such use." 62 The majority
reasoned, "[t]hat would be saying that the public must first appropriate its
own property, the very waters reserved to it and which have always 'belonged' to it."6 3
The court also supported its decision through demonstrating that the
prior appropriation doctrine superceded any riparian claims.' The majority
found that the doctrine of prior appropriation "definitely and wholly superSee Potter, supra note 14, at 489, 491 (showing similarities in the judicial decisions in
55.
Wyoming and New Mexico, which held public ownership of waterways and implied access to
those waterways are imbedded in their state constitutions).
See Potter, supra note 14, at 489-91. The Red River Valley decision was delivered in
56.
1946. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d at 421.
57.
Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d at 424.
58.
Id.
Id. at 434.
59.
Id. at 427.
60.
Id. at 434.
61.
62.
Jd at 432.
63.
Id.
Id at 430. New Mexico adopted a prior appropriation scheme through legislative
64.
enactment upon statehood in 1912. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72 (LexisNexis 2004).
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seded the common-law doctrine of riparian rights."65 Tracing the doctrine of
prior appropriation back to American mining and Mexican water rights practices, the court found the riparian doctrine to be extinct in the American
West. 66 In so doing, the court dispelled any remaining doubt that a riparian
right could be exercised to deny the use of waters lying above or adjacent to
private land.67 Thus, through a constitutional interpretation and inspection of
the western doctrine of prior appropriation, a public right to access was born
in the intermountain west. 68
Like New Mexico, the prior appropriation state of Wyoming has
also recognized a public right to access through an interpretation of its constitution. Article 8, Section 1 of the Wyoming Constitution, proclaiming
"[t]he waters of all natural streams, springs, lakes ... are hereby declared to
be the property of the state," has likewise been interpreted to grant a public
right to access in Wyoming.6 9 In Day v. Armstrong, the Supreme Court of
Wyoming found this provision to grant ownership to state waters and to create an easement for a right of way for public use over private lands.7"
The conflict in Day arose after a private rancher on the North Platte
River fenced off portions of the river, which obstructed the passage of recreational floaters. 7' Day, a recreationalist, sought a judgment declaring his
rights and the public's right to float through private property in Wyoming.72
The Supreme Court of Wyoming found the following facts to be undisputed:
the river segment of concern was capable of floating small craft; because the
river did not meet the federal navigability test, the landowner owned the
3
beds and banks; and the public owned the overlying waters.1

65.
Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d at 430.
66.
Id. at 428. In determining riparianism dead in New Mexico, the Court also cited the
"Colorado doctrine," from the dictum in Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
RedRiver Valley Co., 182 P.2d at 430.
67.
Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d at 430.
68.
Although a right to recreational access was born in New Mexico, the law is still unclear on whether a right to access allows for an incidental right to portage on private land.
See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72 (LexisNexis 2004). The New Mexico Water Code does not address the public's right of access as it may relate to an incidental right to portage on private
land. Id. But see Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d at 429. In Red River Valley Co., the majority cited the access laws of the Partidas, the prior existing Spanish laws in New Mexico in
stating "[e]very man has a right to use them [private lands adjacent to public water], by repairing his ships and his sails upon them, and by landing his merchandise there." Id.
69.
WYO. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
70.
Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 151 (Wyo. 1961).
71.
Id. at 141.
72.
Id. at 138-39. Day's action was also certified for a class action upon remand to the
district court. Id
73.
Id. at 140. The Day court interpreted "state waters" in Article 8, Section 1, of the
Wyoming Constitution to confer title of water to the state, to be held in "[t]rst for the benefit
of the people." Id. at 145.
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The main dispute in Day centered on whether or not such divided interest on waterways afforded a public right to float.74 The court answered in
the affirmative, finding the "actual usability" to be the only limit of the public's right to employ its right to state waters.75 The court's rationale focused
on the practicality of the situation, finding that waters capable of public use
could include incidental contact with the beds and banks, such as "Unavoidable scrapes by the grounding of the craft."76 In the end, Day confirmed that
the public's ownership of waters, granted by the constitution, and allowed
the public to use the water, regardless of the ownership of the banks and
beds."
The federal Public Trust Doctrine ("Doctrine") also recognizes the
public's right to water resources by providing a means of protection for the
public right to water.7" Similar to state constitutional provisions found in
some western states, the Doctrine has provided a basis for a public right of
access in certain contexts, particularly in the northwest.7 9 Public trust theory
was established in common law, which asserts that some aspects of water
resources ought to be beyond the reach of private control and ownership."0
To meet this end, the Doctrine imposes a duty on states to preserve water
resources, held in trust, against significant impairments of public uses.8' In
its modem application, the Doctrine has been described as one of the more
complex and misunderstood legal doctrines effecting environmental laws. 2

74.
75.

Id.
Id. at 143.

Id. at 145-46 (describing permissible incidents to public use, including contact with
76.
the channel and the "right to disembark and pull, push or carry over shoals, rifics and rapids").
77.
Id. at 147. The court in Day found that "[i]rrespective of the ownership of the bed or
channel of waters, and irrespective of their navigability, the public has the right to use public
waters of this State for floating usable craft." Id. Although the right of access, as expressed
in Day, creates a recreational right of way, it remains unclear if it includes an incidental right
to wade or walk. Id.
78.
See generally 4 ROBERT E. BECK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 30 (1991) (discussing the sources of the public right to the use of water).
79.
See generally Osborne, supra note 3 (examining the access laws of Montana, Idaho,
Washington, and Oregon through looking at each state's respective treatment of the Doctrine).
80.
II1.Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892) ("[Ilt is a title held in trust for
the people of the state, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce
over them, and have liberty of fishing therein, freed from the obstruction or interference of
private parties."). The Doctrine was originally established in ancient Roman law, which
deemed the sea and seashores res communes, meaning "common to all." Richard Ausness,
Water Rights, The Public Trust Doctrine,and the Protection of Instream Uses, 1986 U. ILL.
L. REv. 407,409 (1986).
81.
Osborne, supra note 3, at 411 (summarizing the function of the traditional Public
Trust Doctrine as established in Illinois Central).
82.
See DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 389 (Foundation Press
2002) (1971) (stating that the role of the public trust doctrine in the context of navigability is
an elusive concept).
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One scholar claims that "there are fifty-one public trust doctrines in this
country alone.""3
The Doctrine was first exercised in Illinois Central RailroadCo. v.
Illinois, but has since been expanded through subsequent case law.84 In Illinois Central, the United States Supreme Court held that the Doctrine conferred state title to the beds of Lake Michigan under the condition that the
state would facilitate public uses.85 Such uses included the allowance of
public access to the lake for commercial fishing.86 Although the original
Doctrine seemed to apply to a limited set of uses and situations, its scope has
since been expanded by NationalAudubon Society v. Superior Court.87 The
NationalAudubon Society court took the Doctrine one step further by applying it to non-navigable streams for the purpose of reserving quantities of
water to the state. 88 In other instances, the scope of public uses protected by
the trust has been expanded from the original traditional uses of fishing,
commerce, and navigation. Following Illinois Central, a number of jurisdictions have found state trust responsibilities to also include conservation, aesthetics, and recreation purposes. 89
Due to the modem expansion of its legal effect, even the mere use of
the words "public trust" in codified laws has been perceived to have farreaching effects.9" And in the water appropriation context, the Doctrine has
83.
Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the
Source andScope of the TraditionalDoctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 425 (1989).
84.
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 459-60 (summarizing majority's holding). James R.
Rasband, Equitable Compensationfor Public Trust Takings, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 331, 331-32
(1998) (describing Illinois Centralas the foundation of the public trust doctrine).
85.
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452.
86.
Id
87.
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). The California Supreme Court granted the public trust title of the water, beds, and banks of nonnavigable headwaters that feed a navigable lake to the state. Id.at 718-20. The facts of the
case involved the city of Los Angeles, which diverted water from non-navigable headwaters
flowing into Mono Lake, a navigable waterway under the federal test. Id. at 711-12. The
court held that Los Angeles' water rights were subject to the state's public trust right to the
same water. Id. The court held that the Doctrine could be invoked by the petitioner upon
non-navigable waters for the purpose of protecting the waters of Mono Lake itself, ecological
values, and recreation. Id. at 712. Although the court found for an enforceable public trust
interest in the waterways at issue, the court did not definitively determine how the public trust
interest was to be weighted against a conflicting claim with an earlier date of appropriation.
Id.at 732. The case was remanded to the lower court for a final determination and quantification of awards. Id.
88.
NationalAudubon Society, 658 P.2d at 718-20.
89.
See Osborne, supra note 3, at 411 (noting the expansion of permissive uses entrusted
to modem usages of the Doctrine).
90.
See Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust
in Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REv. 701 (Fall 1995). The authors describe the modern day
public trust doctrine's effect on prior appropriation "as the water law equivalent of the rule
against perpetuities." Id. at 703. See also Hill, supra note 4, at 341 (making the proposition
that if Colorado were to adopt the Doctrine for the purpose of establishing public access
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made a big splash in at least two jurisdictions by retroactively reserving
quantities of water for the public over prior appropriated rights." Some
commentators even suggest the same retroactive effect can be applied to
confer a public right of access to waterways.92 These and other recent developments of the Doctrine may or may not continue to push in the direction
of public rights to access by extending the federal Doctrine to state law.
Although states such as California and Washington have judicially expanded
the public trust's traditional scope to include recreation, a future trend to do
the same in the intermountain west is still up for question. 93
Due to its complexity and varying legal applications, the topic is the
source of much debate and commentary among environmental scholars and
is perhaps best left for another article.94 Although the modem Public Trust
Doctrine plays a role in river access policy, its direct effect on title of intermountain riverbeds and banks has yet to take legal effect.9" Like the definitions for federal navigability, the Doctrine with few exceptions has been
understood to confer title of beds and banks on major watercourses in states
bordering the sea and large lakes that have historically sustained commerce.96 With the above considerations in mind, this comment will primarily discuss the public right of access in the context of state laws. On waters
the most definitive role in
of the intermountain west, state laws have had
97
shaping the public right of recreational access.

rights, the Doctrine would also undermine prior appropriations of water). See also Lori Potter, The 1969 Act and Environmental Protection, 3 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 70, 77 (1999)
(describing the public trust in Colorado as "The Two Little Words That Can't Be Spoken").
91.
See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text for California's expanded usage of the
Doctrine. See also Blumm, supra note 90, at 727 (describing Idaho's judicial adoption of
"the California rule" of the Public Trust Doctrine, which extends the Doctrine to include nonnavigable waterways in addition to navigable ones).
92.
Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some of the Traditional
Doctrine, 19 ENvTL. L. 425,465 (1989) (asserting that "[s]ome states have extended the coverage of the trust beyond those watercourses navigable for title to all, or nearly all, waters of
the state").
93.
Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (finding trust purposes to include
uses such as hunting, bathing, and swimming); Orion Corp. v. Washington, 747 P.2d 1062,
1073 (Wash. 1987) (expanding public trust right to include fishing, swimming, water skiing,
and other recreational purposes). See Wilkinson, supra note 92, at 467-69 (arguing that the
judiciary should actively decide matters concerning the expansion of the public trust doctrine
for purposes other than those traditionally defined).
94.
See, e.g., James R. Rasband, Equitable Compensationfor Public Trust Takings, 69 U.
COLO. L. REv. 331 (1998). In the interest of clarity, this comment will not fully address the
public trust implications on access law in the intermountain west.
95.
See generally Osborne, supra note 3, at 411-13 (laying down the foundations of the
Public Trust Doctrine to analyze access law in the American Northwest).
96.
See Wilkinson, supra note 92, at 428-64 for a description of the traditional application
of the Doctrine.
97.
See supra notes 49-77 and accompanying text for discussion of how Wyoming and
New Mexico have established state determinations of navigability.
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As asserted upon the outset of this comment, the modem recognition
of access to public waterways faces challenges based on English common
law.9" Riparian landowners argue that English common law vests exclusive
right of their land up to the heavens, inclusive of the waters that lie within
this area.99 This legal concept has been expressed by courts with the Latin
phrase Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum ("ad coelum"), or "he who
owns the surface of the ground has the exclusive right to everything which is
above it.""3 This ancient doctrine was often used in England as the legal
foundation for water ownership by riparian water users.' ' In a notable 1843
English case, the ad coelum doctrine was used to rationalize a surface landowner's absolute title to groundwater beneath the overlying property, entitling the landowner to freely pump groundwater to the detriment of other
users. 102
The ad coelum argument has also been upheld in American law
through the seminal United States Supreme Court case of United States v.
Causby3 In Causby, a landowner successfully made a Fifth Amendment
takings claim against a neighboring municipal airport for noise disturbance
of their home and chicken farm. The Causby Court held that "[t]he landowner owns at least as much of the space above the ground as he can occupy
or use in connection with the land."" 4 The ad coelum common law as it is
applied by decisions like Causby is intrinsically at odds with the laws that
grant public uses of waterways that lie above private land. When landowners attempt to exclude the public from the surface water overlying their
lands, the conflicts between the two competing legal claims often rises to
litigation." 5
As long as a state's access laws are consistent with U.S. laws and
state jurisdictional laws, states have remained largely free to make their own
determinations of navigability.' 16 As mentioned earlier, states use local
navigability laws to further define the scope of rights associated with the two
98.
See, e.g., Colorado v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1979) (supporting a recreational access ruling in favor of a private landowner by invoking the doctrine of cujus est
solum, ejus est usque ad coelum). For a complete description and analysis of Emmert, see
infra notes 182-214 and accompanying text.
99.
Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1027.
100.
Id.
See, e.g., Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (1843) (invoking the ad coelum
101.
doctrine to find that a surface owners right extended below the surface).
102.
Id.
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
103.
104.
Id. at 261. But see id. at 260-61 for dicta in Causby that found no absolute right to
ownership of land to the periphery of the universe. The court pointed out practical restraints
to absolute ownership, including air as a public highway in certain circumstances. id. at 261.
105.
See Osborne, supra note 3, at 400 (stating that in recent years owners of private property have brought civil trespass suits against public recreationalists).
See supra notes 42, 53 and accompanying text for the legal authority by which states
106.
have been able to establish their own determination on navigability.
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conflicting legal rights associated with public rights to recreation and landowner exclusionary rights."0 7 The main objective of the state law and policy
on access is to reconcile the conflicting legal rights in a manner that best
reflects contemporary values. That is not to say that claims based on ad
coelum principles have always ended after a state makes a determination of
law on navigability.' Nonetheless, to date no such claim has been successfully made and will not likely succeed in the future in light of the Tenth Circuit's recent denial of a takings claim that challenged the state access law of
Montana. 109
B. Diverging Laws in Montana and Colorado
In resolving conflicts between public recreationalists and private
landowners, western states have taken a variety of approaches. I Perhaps
the greatest differences are found between Colorado and Montana law,
which represent two distinctively different policies in the recognition of public access to rivers on private land. With the recent U.S. Supreme Court
decision to deny certiorari in Madison v. Graham, Montana has ended its
lengthy dispute in favor of public recreation."' Colorado, on the other hand,
has had judicial decisions in favor of private land interests. Throughout the
past two decades the Colorado courts have continually acknowledged the
1979 decision of Colorado v. Emmert,
which narrowly defined the scope of
2
the recreational river easement."
Montana and Colorado's laws generally reflect the most liberal and
conservative policies in the west.113 Although both states have grappled with

river access law since statehood, Colorado has consistently favored private
107.
See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text for the proposition that state determinations on navigability broaden the scope of recreational servitudes available to the public.
108.
See, e.g., Madison v. Graham, 316 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied 123 S. Ct.
2221 (2003) (denying petitioner's claim that Montana's recreational access servitude imposed
upon the petitioner's Fifth Amendment right to property.) See infra notes 172-77 and accompanying text for a closer look at the petitioner's Fifth Amendment claim in Madison.
109.
Madison, 316 F.3d at 872, cert. denied 123 S. Ct. 2221 (2003) (denying the possibility of a Fifth Amendment takings claim).
110.
See generallyOsborne, supra note 3, at 402 (asserting that the four states of Montana,
Washington, Oregon, and Idaho have different approaches to water access).
111.
Madison, 316 F.3d at 872. The Madison court implied that the navigability servitude
posed no issues under Fifth Amendment takings claims. Id Madison involved a private
landowner's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim as a result of a law in Montana that
allows the public access to state waterways. Id For a complete discussion of Madison, see
infra notes 166-81 and accompanying text.
112.
Colorado v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1979); see also Bd. of County Comm'rs
of County of Park v. Park County Sportsmen's Ranch, 45 P.3d 693, 710 (Colo. 2002) (citing
Emmert); Bijou lrr. Dist. v. Empire Club, 804 P.2d 175, 185 (Colo. 1991) (citing Emmert).
113.
See Osborne, supra note 3, at 445 (asserting that Montana's access laws are the most
liberal among the Northwestern states of Idaho, Washington, and Oregon). See Potter, supra
note 14, at 498 (implying that Colorado's access laws are the most restrictive among the
states of Wyoming, New Mexico, Utah, Montana, Idaho, and California).
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interests over public uses, recreational rights included." 4 In stark contrast,
Montana has successfully integrated the legal concepts of public resources
within its access law." 5
Since access laws have been extensively adjudicated and challenged
in both states, a deeper look into Colorado and Montana access law is particularly appropriate to the topic of this comment. The underlying issues
behind the "right to float" have already surfaced as the focus of debate in
both Colorado and Montana." 6 In light of the above considerations, the
background section of this comment will continue by further examining the
current laws that shape Colorado's and Montana's public right of access.
1. Comparing Hydrology, Economy, and Water Use in Colorado
and Montana
Montana and Colorado share the distinction of being true headwater
states. The continental divide runs through both states, creating two major
watersheds: one supplying flows eastward towards the Gulf of Mexico and
the other supplying rivers bound for the Pacific Ocean.' Montana's rivers
and streams are major tributaries to both the Missouri and Columbia watersheds, while Colorado headwaters help feed the Missouri, Rio Grande, Arkansas and Colorado River Watersheds." 8
As with many of the western states, the climate of both Colorado
and Montana is dry. In 2004 both states, along with most western states
west of the 100th meridian, were declared major drought areas by federal or
state governments." 9 During an average year the two states receive approximately the same annual precipitation of about fifteen inches and are
respectively ranked the sixth and seventh driest among twelve other

See generally COLO. REv, STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to 602 (2004). These sections consti114.
tute the Colorado Water Code, which does not include any public interest rules or recognition
of the Public Trust Doctrine.
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-301 to 322 (2004). Montana's Stream Access
115.
Law codified a public right of access as well as a number of uses incident to that right. Id.
For a more complete discussion on Montana's Stream Access Law, see infra notes 148-62
and accompanying text. See also MONT. CODE. AN. § 85-2-311 (2003) (requiring public
interest review before large appropriations of water are adjudicated).
See infra notes 134-226 and accompanying text for detailed discussion on the legal
116.
disputes surrounding the "right to float" in Montana and Colorado.
117.
MARK REISNER, CADILAC DESERT ix (Viking Penguin Inc. 1993) (1986).
118.

Id.

119.
See National Drought Mitigation Center, available at http://drought.unl.edu/ (last
visited Feb. 1, 2005). The National Drought Mitigation Center declared various regions of
Colorado and Montana as "drought watch" areas between August 2004 and January 2005. Id.
A "drought watch" declaration is the most severe category designated by the National
Drought Mitigation Center and is based on climate changes, reservoir and lake levels, and
groundwater supply. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol5/iss2/9

16

Burns: Floating on Uncharted Headwaters: A Look at the Laws Governing Re
2005

COMMENT

neighboring western states. 20 Due to high elevations and dry climate, hydrology is dominated by peak flows during spring runoff from winter snowpack, as well as by seasonal precipitation. 2' The majority of precipitation
in
22
these two states occurs in the mountainous regions toward the west.'
Although the bulk of supply originates in the high-alpine regions,
most water demand in Montana and Colorado is based in the arid eastern
plains, where more people reside and long-standing dry land irrigation practices persist. By far, the leading water use in both Colorado and Montana is
irrigation, which constitutes ninety percent of Colorado's total water use and
ninety-six percent of Montana's.'23 In Colorado, public and domestic use is
the second leading source of demand in the state, driven in large part by
growing municipal demands from the city of Denver.
Although Colorado's economy is approximately eight times larger
than Montana's, both states enjoy considerable revenues from recreational
services. J24 In 2001, Colorado businesses received over $125 million in
revenues from rafting operations alone-mainly from the Arkansas River
Valley operations near Salida.125 In Montana, tourism ranks as the number
two economic generator, recently surpassing the timber and mining industries in 2003.126 A large part of Montana's tourism is heavily dependent
upon river recreation. Fishermen by the millions flock to reenact the popular
images of Robert Redford's film, A River Runs Through it, and river runners
worldwide come to enjoy the pristine flows from Montana's National Park

120.
See Western Regional Climate Center, Climatological Data Summaries, available at
http://www.wrcc.dri.edu/climsum.html. (last visited Feb. 1, 2005).
121.
See United States Department of Agriculture, Natural Resource Conservation Service,
Water Supply Outlook for the Western United States, available at http://www.wcc.nrcs.usda.gov/wsf/foreword.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2005) (correlating water supply in the western United States to runoff characteristics from mountain snow-pack).
122.
World Atlas.Com, Montana Precipitation Map, available at http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/namerica/usstates/mt.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2005); World
Atlas.Corn, Colorado PrecipitationMap, available at http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/nanerica/usstates/co.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2005).
123.
United States Geological Survey, Estimated Use of Water in the U.S. (2000), available at http://water.usgs.gov/pubs/circ/2004/circ1268/htdocs/tableO2.html (last visited Apr.
30, 2005).
124.
United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (2001), available at http://www.uawc.org/newsijuly2001.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2005).
125.
Becky Goff, Upper Arkansas Watershed Council Newsletter, March 2002 (stating
that the Upper Arkansas River rafting industry brought in profits of over $60 million in 2001,
making the area nationally known as one of the nations largest rafting industry regions). See
also Water News Online, October 2002, available at http://www.uswaternews.coml/archives/arcsupply/224mil 10.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2005).
126.
Kimberley Roth, Picture the Progress 2003; A special report on Montana's Economy, availableat http://www.missoulian.com/bonus/progress03/progress38.html (last visited
Apr. 30, 2005).
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System. 2 Overall, both states seem to rely heavily on water resources for
recreational uses, but are challenged by persistent drought patterns and competing demands of growth and irrigation.
2. Legal Foundations behind the "Right to Float" in Colorado and
Montana
Montana and Colorado both share a likeness in hydrology, a high
demand for irrigation, and both depend upon the economic benefits of strong
outdoor recreation industries; however, the states differ greatly in how their
laws recognize the public's "right to float." The very different access laws
found in Montana and Colorado today were first created by judicial interpretation of each state's respective constitutional provisions on public river
rights. 2 s The constitutional interpretations were then given practical meaning through a court determination of the actual scope of the recreational servitude. The legislatures of each state have taken the role of either supporting
the court determinations by codifying the effect of the opinion, filling in
where the defined servitude is silent, or remaining inactive on the issue.
a) Constitutional Foundations behind the "Right to Float"
The constitutions of both intermountain states share a dedication to
pure prior appropriation and recognition of public rights to state water resources. Both states' constitutional provisions on water rights specifically
vest state waters to the public, subject only to the appropriative rights of
individuals to make beneficial use of water through diversion.'29 Article 16,
Section 5 of the Colorado Constitution proclaims, "[t]he water of every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the state of Colorado, is
hereby declared to be the property of the public . . . subject to appropriation."' 30 Similarly, Article 9, Section 3 of the Montana Constitution declares, "all surface, underground, flood, and atmospheric waters within the
boundaries of the state are the property of the statefor the use of its people
3
and are subject to appropriation for beneficial uses as provided by law.' '
The plain meaning of both constitutional provisions appears to vest
all unappropriated waters of the state as public property. Nonetheless, as the
case law and subsequent legislative responses to court decisions began to
unfold in each state, the meaning of these nearly identical provisions has
127.
See Morris, supra note 6, at 260. Morris asserts that "[t]ourism became big business
in Montana, and many people came to fish, as evidenced by the fact that Montana now sells
the third highest number of non-resident sport fishing licenses in the United States." Id.
128.
See generally Madison v. Graham, 316 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2002); Colorado v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1979).
129. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3; COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
130.
COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5 (emphasis added).
MONT. CONsT. art. IX, § 3 (emphasis added).
131.
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diverged. Colorado's law, as established in the Colorado v. Emmert decision, narrowly defined the public's recreational easement.'32 In Montana,
the case of Madison v. Graham, coupled with enactments by the legislature,
1 33
has resulted in a broad constitutional right of public access to state waters.
b) Montana Access Law: Madison and Other Laws that Shape
Montana's Broadly Defined Recreational Easement
In Montana, the landmark opinion of Madison v. Graham was preceded by a series of state supreme court decisions in the 1980s.1'3 The 1982
decision of Montana Coalitionfor Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran involved a
landowner's attempt to prevent recreationists from floating down the Dearborn River through his land.' 35 At the district court level, the Coalition's
claim for a public right to use the river won partial summary judgment. 36
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Montana entirely rejected the landowner's
trespass claim.'37 The court's sweeping decision recognized the public's
constitutional right to state waters and interpreted the right to include public
recreation "on any surface waters that are capable" of such use. 3 '
According to the court, recognition of recreational rights was
founded on both the public trust doctrine and the constitution, although it
remains unclear if the public trust doctrine was at all necessary to confer a
public right.'39 Through a preliminary analysis of the public trust doctrine
and navigability law, the court determined that title to the beds and banks
remained with the state. 4 However, the court later eroded the importance
132.
Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025.
133.
Madison v. Graham, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (D. Mont. 2001), ajfg 316 F.3d 867 (9th
Cir. 2002), cert. denied 123 S. Ct. 2221 (2003). See infra notes 148-81 and accompanying
text for description of Montana's Stream Access Law and discussion of Madison.
134.
Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984);
Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088 (Mont. 1984); Gait v.
Dept. of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, 731 P.2d 912 (Mont. 1987).
135.
Curran, 682 P.2d at 165.
136.
Id. at 165.
137.
Id. at 172.
138.
Id.
139.
Matt Clifford, PreservingStream Flows in Montana Through the ConstitutionalPublic Trust Doctrine: An Underrated Solution, 16 PUB. LAND L. REV. 117, 125-26 (1995)
("[The] exact relationship between the two [public trust doctrine and Constitution] is not
entirely clear in the opinion.").
140.
Id. The court determined that title to beds and banks vested in the state at the time of
statehood under the federal log-floating test. Curran, 682 P.2d at 166-68. The court went on
to determine that title remained in the state, citing the public trust doctrine from Illinois Central. Id. at 167-68. However, the necessity of this finding for the purpose of the court's final
ruling has been questioned. See Osborne, supra note 3, at 434-35 ("Given the constitutional
basis of the court's holdings and their subsequent codification in the Stream Access Law, the
public trust doctrine is not really necessary to ensure broad public access to water bodies for
recreation [in Montana]."). Furthermore, the application of Illinois Central as it relates to the
Montana's trust obligation is confusing in light of the fact that the State does not have navi-
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of the title analysis, declaring that private ownership of the Dearborn River's
streambed was irrelevant to the question of the public's right of use. 4 ' In
reaching its decision, the Curran majority followed the Wyoming decision
in Day v. Armstrong, finding that "[i]n essence, the question is whether the
waters owned by the State under the Constitution are susceptible to recreational use by the public.""'4 Thus, Curran established a right of access in
Montana through granting a public servitude on state waterways from the
Montana Constitution.143
A year later, Curran was upheld and further clarified in Montana
Coalitionfor Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, a case involving a similar conflict that took place on the Beaverhead River in southwestem Montana.'" In
Hildreth, the constitutionally protected public right to state waters was again
interpreted to grant a right to float and the scope of the recreational easement
was thereby established. 4 The public was given a "[flight to access for
fishing and navigational purposes to the point of the high water mark" and a
right to portage in "the least intrusive manner possible" when faced with
barriers.'46 Overall, Hildreth affirmed Curran by reiterating that the capabilities of the waters themselves establish the public's recreational easement,
47
and further clarified Curran by spelling out the scope of the easement. 1
The Hildreth and Curran opinions were codified into law the following year with the passage of Montana's Stream Access Law (the
"SAL").' 4 In 1984, legislative leaders met to develop the SAL in an attempt
to define terms left unclear by Hildreth and Curran, and thereby allay the
fears of landowners over the scope of the rulings. 4 9 The law's sponsor, state
representative Bob Ream, touted it as an effort to "keep the law within the
bounds of the Montana Supreme Court decisions and to express the Legisla-

gable title for purposes of commerce as found in Illinois Central. See Clifford, supra note
139, at 126.
See generally Clifford, supra note 139. In support of its position, Curran relied upon
141.
the majority in the Wyoming case, Day v. Armstrong, which held that the public has the right
to use public waters of the State without interference or curtailment by any landowner, irrespective of the ownership of the streambed or of their navigability. Curran, 682 P.2d at 170
(citing Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 147 (Wyo. 1961)). Wyoming has yet to adopt the
Public Trust Doctrine for the purposes of finding a public right to access. See generallyDay,
362 P.2d 137 (omitting any discussion of the Doctrine in establishing a public right of access).
142.
Curran,682 P.2d at 170 (citing Day, 362 P.2d at 147).
See Clifford, supra note 139, at 126 (asserting that the primary authority in the
143.
Currandecision came from the Montana Constitution).
Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088 (Mont. 1984).
144.
145.
Id.
Id. at 1091.
146.

147.
148.
149.

See Morris, supra note 6, at 27 1.
MONT. CODE ANN.§§ 23-2-301 to 322 (2004).
See Morris, supranote 6, at 273.
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ture's desire to tie down and define the areas that were left very broad in
those decisions."150
The final SAL legislation was signed into law in 1985, and like the
Hildreth and Curran decisions, it interprets the constitutional public right
broadly.' 5 ' Section 302 of the SAL provides that "all surface waters that are
capable of recreational use may be so used by the public without regard to
'
Such public use of wathe ownership of the land underlying the waters."152
terways extends to the ordinary high water mark and allows an incidental
right to portage on private land.' 53 Although the public has no right to enter
or cross private property to access waterways, the public in Montana has an
incidental right to "portage around barriers in the least intrusive manner possible."'154 Through these main provisions, Montana's SAL clearly describes
a state recreational servitude with a defined scope for boating,
155 fishing,
swimming, and other forms of recreation on all of its waterways.
The SAL was slightly restructured by the Montana Supreme Court's
15 6
interpretation in Galt v. State Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks.
Galt, a private landowner, sought a declaratory judgment that the law in the
SAL was unconstitutional on its face. 57 Gait attempted to convince the
court that the SAL and the Hildreth and Curran decisions constituted a taking of private property without just compensation.'5
Despite the plaintiffs best efforts, the court upheld prior law, finding no taking of the plaintiff's property, but directed some amendment of the
SAL where the court felt the statute went too far. 59 In doing so, the court
reaffirmed the constitutional public access right, but limited it to "only such
use as is necessary to utilization of the water itself."' 60 Based on this reason150. Gait v. Dept. of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, 731 P.2d 912, 919 (Mont. 1987) (quoting
Hearings on H.B. 265 before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 49th Leg., 1st Sess. (Mar. 8,
1985)).
151. See Osborne, supra note 3, at 432 (asserting that the SAL basically codified the holdings of Curran and Hildreth).
152. MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-302(1) (2004).
153. Id. § 311. The "ordinary high water mark" is characterized by soils, terrestrial vegetation, and the destruction of the land's vegetative value (non-inclusive of the flood plain, adjacent to surface waters). Id § 301(9).
154. Id. § 311 (granting an incidental right to portage). Montana's SAL also disallows
public entry on private property in order to use waters for recreational purposes. Id § 302(4).
155. See id § 301(10). The strcam access statute defines "recreational use" to mean "fishing, hunting, swimming, floating in small craft or other floatation devices, boating in motorized craft unless otherwise prohibited or regulated by law, or craft propelled by oar or paddle,
other water-related pleasure activities, and related unavoidable or incidental uses." Id.
156. Gait v. Dept. of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, 731 P.2d 912 (Mont. 1987).
157. Id. at 913.
158. Id.
159. See Morris, supra note 6, at 274 (asserting that the Gait majority sought out limitations to the SAL in order to better reflect prior case law on the subject).
160. Gait, 731 P.2d at 915.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2005

21

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 5 [2005], No. 2, Art. 9
WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 5

ing, the court struck down the provisions of the statute that conferred public
rights to overnight camping, construction of duck blinds, big game hunting,
and requirements of private owners to compensate for the cost of portage
routes.' t Although the Gait decision slightly refined the bounds of the recreational easement, the case still stands as an affirmation 1of
62 the public right
of access up to the high water mark of Montana's streams.
Like Curran, the majority in Galt relied on the Wyoming case of
Day v. Armstrong for support. The Galt limitation of incidental use to "such
use as is necessary to utilization of the water itself' almost exactly mirrors
the language in Day that declared, "[w]hen so floating craft, as a necessary
incident to that use, the bed or channel of the waters may be unavoidably
scraped or touched by the grounding of craft." '63 Thus, Galt maintained
legal consistency by relying on the same authority that previous Montana
case law relied upon.' In doing so, Galt used Wyoming law for guidance
for the rule of incidental contact, this time finding that the public's owneruses that are "necessary"
ship of surface water confers only those incidental
65
to the full enjoyment of the public easement.
Despite the strong rulings of Curran,Hildreth, and Galt, as well as
legislative affirmation of those rulings, landowners continued to challenge
Montana's access law. 66 Montana's SAL was contested again at the federal
level in Madison v. Graham, a case that serves as the most representative of
the current judicial opinion on the "right to float" in Montana.167 In Madison, landowners brought action in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Montana to enjoin the State from enforcing the SAL. 6 ' The landowner's
action against the director of Montana's Department of Fish, Wildlife, and
Parks was fought over some of Montana's most prominently fished and
69
boated rivers, including the Stillwater and Ruby Rivers and O'Dell Creek.1
The dividing lines of the Madison conflict were quickly drawn and aggressively supported on both sides. Madison's claim drew the attention of inter161.
See Morris, supra note 6, at 274 (describing the legal effect of Gait as well as the
court's reasoning behind its decision).
Galt, 731 P.2d at 915 (upholding the law from Curran and Hildreth that grants a
162.
public right of use up to the high water mark of a waterway).
163.
Id. at 917 (Gulbrandson, J., concurring); Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 145-46
(Wyo. 1961).
164.
See supra note 142 and accompanying text for a description of how the Curran court
likewise relied on Wyoming law.
165.
Galt, 731 P.2d at 915-16.
166.
See generally Madison v. Graham, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (D. Mont. 2001), affd 316
F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied 123 S. Ct. 2221 (2003).
167.
Id. Although the issues were appealed in the Ninth Circuit, the district court ruling
was upheld and has not, to date, been appealed again at the federal level. See infra notes 17277 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion on the post-District Court rulings on
this issue.
168.
Madison, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 1322.
169.
Id.
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vening defendants Trout Unlimited, the Montana Coalition for Stream Access, the Montana Wildlife Federation, and the Fishing Outfitters Association of Montana. 7 ° Madison, the original plaintiff, was joined by landowners from neighboring watersheds and gained substantial financial support
from the Colorado-based Mountain States Legal Foundation. 17'
Madison challenged the constitutionality of the statute under both a
process
and void for vagueness claim.'72 The district court dismissed
due
both claims, holding that the due process claim was barred by res judicata
and that the void for vagueness complaint was without merit. 7 a The takings
aspect of Madison's Fourteenth Amendment argument also failed, because
the state was deemed to have a legitimate governmental interest in enforcing
the statute. The statute was found to substantially advance a legitimate government interest in managing Montana's natural resources and promoting
recreation.174 Furthermore, the court found that the recreational easement on
private land did not deny property owners of all economically viable use of
his land. 175 After Madison lost at the district level, Madison sought an appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, focusing
on a Fifth Amendment takings claim. 176 The Court of Appeals dismissed
Madison's new complaint on similar grounds, and despite appeals reaching
as high as the U.S. Supreme Court in 2003, the Hildreth and Curran precedent was upheld.'
Overall, Madison further defined the scope of easement for recreational use and strengthened the law under Hildreth and Curran. In addition
to reaffirming the right of access for recreational floating that was originally
granted in Hildreth and Curran, the Madison decision expressly recognized
other uses that incidentally occur out of the exercise of those uses codified
by the SAL.'78 The court used the example of wading to illustrate when an
Idat 1320.
170.
Id. at 1322. The Mountain States Legal Foundation was created by Coors Brewing
171.
Company and James Watt (President Reagan's Secretary of Interior). See Montana River
Action, Navigable Rivers and Public Access, available at http://www.montanariveraction.org/navigable-rivers.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2005). Donors to the fund include
Amoco, Chevron, Texaco, Coors, Ford, and Phillips Petroleum. Id.
Madison, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 1322.
172.
173.
Id. at 1327-28. The plaintiffs void for vagueness argument asserted that the statute
failed to clarify whether natural or artificial barriers constituted a permissible portage by
public river users. Id. The claim was dismissed for failure to meet the constitutional standard. Id. The prior Montana case of Galt barred the plaintiffs due process claim. _d (citing
Galt v. State Dept. of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 749 P.2d 1089 (1988)).
174.
Id.at 1325.
Jd. at 1324.
175.
See Madison v. Graham, 316 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied 123 S. Ct. 2221
176.
(2003).
177.
Id.
178.
Madison, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 1324. The district court described wading as "an incidental de minimis appurtenance entirely dependent upon use of the surface water." Id.
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incidental touching of the streambed is permissible as a de minimis intrusion
of private property.' 79 Wading on streambeds, as incident to the public's
codified right to fish, was found to cause "[n]o more interference with priAlthough additional incidental
vate property rights than does a floater." '
uses have yet to be decided in court, other recreational users may act under
the assumption that incidental contact directly related to other reasonable
This assumption is unlikely to be successfully
uses is protected by law.'
contested in court since the legislature has clearly defined the scope through
the SAL and the courts have tested the statute's validity through the decisions of Madison and Galt.
c) Colorado Access Law: Emmert and Other Laws that Shape
Colorado's Narrowly Defined Recreational Easement
By contrast, Colorado's courts have interpreted the constitutionally
protected public right to unappropriated waters very narrowly. The Colorado Supreme Court's divided decision in Colorado v. Emmert is representative of Colorado's current judicial opinion on the "right to float" and reveals
the court's allegiance to the ad coelum argument made by private landowners.' 82 The opinion in Emmert concludes by holding no public right to the
83
use of waters overlying private land without the consent of the owner."
The Emmert holding has been acknowledged by courts over the past two
decades.' 84 In the absence of legislation that describes a public servitude,
current definition of the recreational easement
Emmert stands as Colorado's
85
on its surface waters.'
The Emmert conflict involved a group of rafters who were criminally prosecuted for third-degree criminal trespass.'86 The rafters were float179.
Id.
180.
Id.
181.
Id. The court held incidental contact, such as wading, is permissible because the
"interest and intent of the public is to appropriate and use the surface water." Id. It can be
assumed that absent further rulings on the issue, other incidental uses are permissible as long
as the "interest and intent" of the public is for "use [of] the surface water." Id.
182.
Colorado v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1979). Justice Lee delivered the majority
opinion of the court and Justice Groves and Carrigan filed dissenting opinions. Id.
183.
Id. at 1029-30.
184.
See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs of County of Park v. Park County Sportsmen's
Ranch, 45 P.3d 693 (Colo. 2002); Bijou Irr. Dist. v. Empire Club, 804 P.2d 175 (Colo. 1991).
185.
See generally COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to 602 (2004). These statutory provisions constitute the Colorado Water Code, which does not include any law on the public right
of access. Id. Justice Lee in his majority Emmert opinion stated that "[i]f the increasing
demand for recreational space on the waters of this state is to be accommodated, the legislative process is the proper method to achieve this end." Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1029. Despite
several citizen initiatives to amend the constitution to permit an undisputed right of safe passage, the legislature has yet to respond. See American Whitewater, Colorado Navigability
Report, available at http://www.americanwhitewater.org/access/navigability/-reports/CO.htm
(last visited Apr. 30, 2005).
186.
Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1026.
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ing down a segment of the Colorado River which bisected the property of a
private ranch." 7 After ducking a barbed wire barrier and floating through
the private property, the rafters were placed under arrest by a deputy sheriff.' The facts stipulated that the defendants made contact with the riverbed
from time to time in order to control the progress of the rafts.' It was further stipulated that the stretch of the Colorado River under dispute did not
meet the federal navigability test. 190
Much like the defense in Madison, the floaters claimed they had a
public right to float, granted by the Colorado Constitution, as well as an
The defense relied upon
easement for any trespass incident to that right.'
Article 16, Section 5 of the Colorado Constitution, which proclaims, "It]he
water of every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the state of
Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of the public.. . subject to
appropriation."' 92 The constitutionally based defense failed: the Colorado
Supreme Court held that the Colorado Constitution afforded no such public
right to recreational use through private land, especially when it compromises a landowner's right to exclusion.' 93 In support of its holding, the court
cited the common law ad coelum rule, which was said to have been implicitly adopted by prior Colorado case law.'94
The Emmert court reasoned that the private ad coelum rights were
superior to any reserved rights that may have been granted to the public
upon Colorado's adoption of its constitution. Article 16, Section 5 was interpreted within the historical context of its 1876 ratification.'95 Justice Lee
in his majority opinion found:
[S]ection 5, Article XVI of the Colorado Constitution was
primarily intended to preserve the historical appropriation
system of water rights upon which the irrigation economy in
Colorado was founded, rather than to assure public
access to
96
waters for purposes other than appropriation.

187.
Id.
188.
Id
189.
Id.
190.
Id.
191.
Id. at 1027.
192.
COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5 (emphasis added).
193.
Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1029.
194. Id at 1027. The Emmert majority found that the ad coelum doctrine was implicitly
adopted by Colorado courts in Hartman v. Tresise, 84 P. 685 (Colo. 1906). But see Emmert,
597 P.2d at 1031 (Groves, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Groves questions whether the
ad coelum was adopted in Hartman, stating "it is not clear that Hartman adopted this rule."
Id. (Groves, J., dissenting).
195.
Id.at 1028.
196.
Id
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The Emmert court gave deference to the legislative posture on public
rights to waterways in order to justify its narrow interpretation. The majority claimed that the Colorado Legislature has had a disposition toward keeping its waters "[n]ot unrestrictedly open to the public."'97 The majority's
cited support included legislation governing the Wildlife Commission's
power to negotiate with landowners to open their land to public hunting and
fishing, the power of landowners to limit liability to public users on their
land, and a provision in the criminal code that makes it unlawful for hunters
and fishermen to trespass without permission from the landowner."
Most notably, the Emmert court relied on section 18-4-504.5 of the
Colorado criminal trespass statute.'99 In 1977, while Emmert's case was
pending appeal, the General Assembly passed section 18-4-504.5 to define
"premise" of private property for the purpose of determining trespass.2" In
so doing, the legislature included stream banks and beds within a list of legally protected private premises. 20' The Emmert majority ended its analysis
by citing section 18-4-504.5 as the last piece of evidence that the legislature
intended Emmert's conduct to constitute a trespass.02
Although section 18-4-504.5 of the criminal trespass statute supported the Emmert Court's finding that a trespass occurred through the defendant's conduct, it failed to provide clarity for the overall access issue.20 3
Unlike the SAL Legislation in Montana, section 18-4-504.5 failed to address
three main points: whether a trespass would occur in the civil context; if the
law allowed recreationalists to legally float on water that runs above what is
defined as a "premise;" and whether fencing by a landowner is permissible
to protect these "premises. '"'2 The court concluded its analysis by deferring
its future decision-making power to the legislature, providing that "if the
increasing demand for recreational space on the waters of this state is to be
197.
Id. at 1029.
198.
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 33-1-112(g); 33-41-102(2); 33-6-123(1) (1970).
199.
COLO. REV.STAT. § 18-4-504.5 (2004).
200.
See Hill, supra note 4, at 334 for a description of how section 18-4-504.5 applies to
the law in Emmert.
201.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-504.5.
202.
Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1029-30.
203.
See Potter, supra note 14, at 458. Potter points out that there are several unresolved
issues in the aftermath of Emmert, including civil liability and whether floating without contacting beds and banks is permissible. Id. Emmert and section 18-4-504.5 also failed to address how section 18-9-107(1)(a) of the criminal code was to be enforced in light of the Emmert's holding and the new legislative enactment. See Potter, supra note 14 at 475. Section
107(1)(a) of the criminal code makes it a misdemeanor to obstruct a waterway "to which the
public or a substantial group of the public has access." COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-107(1)(a)
(2004). Although this provision seems to indicate the legislature's intent to protect boaters
from dangerous obstructions, such as barbed wire, neither Emmert nor any other reported
cases have applied this law. See Potter, supranote 14, at 475.
204.
See Potter, supra note 14, at 475 (describing the gray areas left out of the decision in
Emmert).
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accommodated, the legislative process is the proper method to achieve this
end."2 ' Despite the fact that neither section 18-4-504.5 nor Emmert address
these three gray areas of access law, the Colorado legislature has yet to lend
any clarity to the situation.0 6
Currently, the only explanation of law in regard to these finer points
has come in the form of an Attorney General's Opinion." 7 In 1983, Colorado Attorney General Duane Woodard issued a formal opinion in response
to the mounting confusion that remained in the aftermath of Emmert and
section 18-4-504.5.2"s First, Woodard found that the criminal trespass statute
and the Emmert decision do not prohibit a person's right to float over private
property when banks and beds are not touched by the floater. 0 9 Second,
Woodard found that the Emmert decision only applies in the criminal trespass context, and therefore the law does not afford civil remedy for victims
of trespass under the Emmert law.2"0 Finally, Woodard opined that the law
cannot be "viewed as authorizing the owners of stream banks and beds to
prohibit or otherwise control the use for floating of waters passing over their
lands., 2t 1
The Attorney General's reasoning comes from the legislative history
of the criminal trespass statute's definition of "premises. 21 2 In proposing
section 18-4-504.5, Senator Kinney, the bill's primary sponsor, explained
that the definition "[w]ill not stop tubing, canoeing or boating on the water,
but will give the property owners the help of law enforcement officials
against a few people bent on causing trouble." Senator Kinney went on to
clarify that the bill "[s]imply makes it a criminal trespass to loiter on the
stream banks, as the Bill is now, or on the stream beds. If they want to canoe or tube or stay on the water, not bother the properties, why there would
be no problem."2 3 Despite the supportive statements made in Woodard's
opinion, conflicts over the finer points
that were not addressed by Emmert
14
continue on Colorado's waters today.

205.
Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1029.
206.
But see Potter, supra note 14, at 476 (asserting that the legislative intention in mentioning banks and beds, but not "water" or "channel" in section 18-4-504.5 was deliberately
done in order to approve of floating through private property).
207.
1983 Colo. AG Lexis 42.
208.
See Potter, supranote 14, at 478 (discussing the "Woodard Opinion" as an interpretation of the impact of the statutory trespass statute).
209.
1983 Colo. AG Lexis 42.
210.
Id.
211.
Id
212.
Id.
213.
1983 Colo. AG Lexis 42 (citing transcript of the Senate Committee of the Whole
Hearing on Second Reading of S.B. 360, March 31, 1977, at 2-4).
214.
See, e.g., supra note 7 and accompanying text for an example of recent conflict. See
also American Whitewater, Colorado Navigability Report, available at http://www.anericanwhitewater.org/access/navigability/reports/CO.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2005) (identifying
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d) What Does This All Mean? The Law in Practice on Montana
and Colorado's Rivers and Streams
As discussed in the previous section, Colorado and Montana lawmakers have recognized the public right to float in some form, however varied it may be. The laws of each state have played the role of addressing the
constitutionally granted right by defining the scope of the recreation easement. When all of Montana's public access laws are interpreted in concert,
the following rules apply to recreationalists looking to float through private
lands:
(1) All surface waters capable of recreational use may be
ordinary high water mark, regardused by the public to the
21 5
less of land ownership;
(2) When faced with a dangerous situation or when faced
may portage on private land
with a barrier, recreationalists
2t 6
manner;
intrusive
least
in the
(3) Recreational use includes fishing, hunting, swimming,
boating by oar or engine, and all related incidental uses (including incidental contact with beds and banks); 217
(4) Permissible recreational use does not include overnight
camping, construction of duck blinds, and big game hunting;2 8 and
(5) Fisherman may contact underlying riverbeds in order to
fish rivers and streams.219
All of these enumerated rights may be exercised by the public without interference from landowners. Furthermore, landowners do not have standing for
a Fifth Amendment takings claim when any of these public rights are exercised.22°
By contrast, Colorado's vague recreational easement described in
Emmert cannot be so easily described in just a few sentences. In Montana
incidental contact is okay, while in Colorado it remains unclear whether or
major areas of contention on the Cheeseman Gorge run from Lake George to the Cheeseman
Reservoir, the Lake Fork of the Gunnison, the Taylor River, Bear Creek through the City of
Morrison, and stretches of the Cache la Poudre River).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-302(1) (2004).
215.
Id. § 23-2-311.
216.
217.
Id.§ 23-2-301(10).
Gait v. Dep't of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, 731 P.2d 912,915 (Mont. 1987).
218.
Madison v. Graham, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1324 (D. Mont. 2001).
219.
Id.at 1326.
220.
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not, or in what situations, incidental contact is permissible. There are several reasons why the decision in Emmert lends itself to ambiguity. First,
Emmert addressed a conflict that arose out of stipulation that the defendants
made contact with the riverbed.221 It does not address how the law applies to
a floater who does not touch river bottom. Second, Emmert involved a
criminal suit and leaves open whether or not landowners have any civil recourse.222 And finally, it is unclear when a private landowner may fence off
a river to exclude the public and, when such an exclusionary right exists,
whether a boater has a right of portage.223 In the end, Emmert does not provide a sufficient blueprint for landowners and recreationalists to follow.224
Lawsuits on these finer points are currently wending their way
through the Colorado state courts but have yet to be defined in law. 225 In the
meantime, all of these areas of ambiguity have prompted misunderstanding
among landowners and recreationalists alike, as local police continue to
threaten prosecution for citizen-initiated complaints.226
III.

ANALYSIS

The dissimilar laws and policies between the two states are particularly striking in light of the many similarities otherwise shared by the two
states. Montana and Colorado share a likeness in hydrology, recreational
221.
People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1026 (Colo. 1979).
222.
Id.
223.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-9-107(1)(a) (2004). Although the obstruction criminal statute
goes as far as to give a boater criminal recourse when faced with an unlawful obstruction, it
does not inform a boater of what to do in order to avoid trespass when such circumstances
exist. Id. Furthermore, the legislature has sent mixed signals by proclaiming that obstruction
of public waters is a criminal act and by later defining a trespass to include the touching beds
and banks of rivers on private land. Id. (making it a misdemeanor to obstruct a waterway to
which the public has access); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-4-504.5 (2004) (determining contact
with private beds and banks underneath a waterway a trespass).
224. See Potter, supra note 14, at 458 (discussing ambiguities in the Emmert opinion).
225.
See, e.g., Jason Robertson, River Access in Colorado Under Siege, American Whitewater, Aug. 23, 2001, available at http://www.americanwhitewater.org/archive/article/195
(last visited Apr. 30, 2005). In 2001 a number of claims based on issues that were left unresolved in Emmert were filed in Colorado district courts. Id. Cannibal Outdoors, a river outfitter, was named as a defendend in Gunnison County District Court for alleged civil trespass
on the Gunnison River through the private pary of Gateview Ranch. Id. On the Taylor River,
a landowner was found to have no legal right for threatening boaters on a stretch of river that
he believed to be private property. Id. The landowner was sentenced to "10 days in jail, 1
year probation, 96 hours public service, and about $450 in fmes ... he also has to attend
anger management counseling, carry no firearms, and send letters of apology to the victims."
Id.
226.
See American Whitewater, Colorado Navigability Report, available at
http://www.americanwhitewater.org/access/navigability/reports/CO.htm (last visited Apr. 30,
2005) (referring to the dismissal of two cases against four boaters on the Cheeseman Gorge
segment of the South Platte River). On better understanding of the limited scope of the Eminert decision, district attorneys responsible for the prosecution, however, have dismissed
many of these cases. Id.
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growth, constitution, and water administrative systems, all of which should
in theory dictate similar legal structures for public river access.227 Nonetheless, the current and contrary legal structures provide sound lessons for future lawmakers in the intermountain states. The analysis section of this
comment will evaluate the access laws of Montana and Colorado, first from
a legal perspective and second in terms of policy implications.
A. Emmert Got it Wrong
The 1979 Emmert decision in Colorado is outdated and stands in
isolation with respect to other established laws.228 First, the Colorado law on
access is inconsistent with other laws in Colorado, such as its current law on
public servitudes and other laws within its water code.229 Second, Emmert's
reliance on the ad coelum argument runs contrary to federal law. 230 The
ancient ad coelum doctrine that Emmert depends upon quite simply holds no
This is especially true in jurisdicwater in federal and state jurisdictions.'
tions like Colorado that have done away with the riparian doctrine altogether
through adopting a pure prior appropriation water rights system. 32 Third,
rather than depending upon the ancient doctrine for authority, Emmert
should have looked to how access issues are handled in other prior appropriation states in the intermountain west.233 In this respect, Colorado's interpretation of its state constitution runs contrary to the persuasive interpretations found in the neighboring prior appropriation states of Wyoming, New
Mexico, and Montana.234

Before analyzing how the law in Emmert is contrary to federal and
other similar intermountain state laws, it is important to note how Emmert is
inconsistent with other Colorado law. First, Emmert is at odds with ColoSee supra notes 119-27 and accompanying text (describing similarities in hydrology
227.
and recreation growth shared between both states); supra notes 129-31 and accompanying
text (describing similarities in state constitutions).
See People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1032 (1979) (Carrigan, J., dissenting). In his
228.
dissent, Justice Carrigan asserted that the ancient doctrine of Cujus est slum, ejus est usque ad
coelum, which the majority relies upon, was never imported into Colorado's early common
law. Id. The dissent stated that "[t]he principle is of such antiquity that the majority has to
express it in Latin. Id.
See infra notes 235-57 and accompanying text for an analysis of relevant Colorado
229.
laws.
See infra notes 258-74 and accompanying text for an analysis of federal law.
230.
See infra notes 258-74 and accompanying text for the proposition that ad coelum has
231.
been made obsolete in federal law.
See Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882) (establishing the pure prior
232.
appropriation system in Colorado).
233.
See Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1034 (Carrigan, J., dissenting) (implying that the majority
should have recognized the same rights of access adopted in eleven other states west of the
Mississippi River). For the proposition that Colorado law should follow the mainstream law
expressed in other western states, see Potter, supra note 14, at 499.
See infra notes 277-91 for a discussion of how Wyoming, New Mexico, and Montana
234.
interpret their state constitutions on public rights to waterways.
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rado's case law governing prescriptive easements for public trails. During
the last year, Colorado has adopted a unique set of case law that recognizes
rural trails and roads as public highways. In Bockstiegel v. Board of County
Commissioners, an old stagecoach road was granted a prescriptive easement
through private property for the public's use." 5 The prescriptive easement
was granted after
a showing of adverse use for a statutory period of twenty
236
years or more.
Hiking trails in Colorado are also considered public highways with
certain prescriptive rights. In McIntyre v. Board of County Commissioners,
the Colorado Supreme Court determined that an easement by prescription
could be created for public trails if the petitioner could show adverse use for
the twenty-year statutory period.2 7 Although in this case the petitioner
failed to show adverse use by hikers, the court nonetheless set the precedent
that prescriptive rights do in fact apply to public trails. 38 In light of more
recent case law, it seems reasonable that prescriptive rights might likewise
be granted to public waterways. Emmert needs to be revisited in order to
better reflect Colorado's current law on public rights of way. Because modem case law in Colorado seems to recognize waterways as public highways
for the purposes of establishing adverse possession claims, Emmert should
have addressed the issue in its opinion.29 Nonetheless, the Emmert opinion
fails to discuss the possibility of a prescriptive easement altogether.24
Secondly, the Emmert opinion is flawed because its method of interpreting the state constitution is inconsistent with how the same constitutional
provision has been interpreted by modem Colorado courts. In order for the
Emmert court to reach its holding, the Court carefully examined Article 16,
Section 5 of the Colorado Constitution, which declares unappropriated water
to be "the property of the public.""24 Through a historical interpretation, the
Emmert majority found the framers used this language with the intent to
preserve the appropriation system rather than grant an actual public right for
the purpose of providing rights like access. 24 2 This interpretation is inconsistent with modern court opinions, which implicitly recognized Article 16,
Section 5 to mean much more than merely an intention to protect a water
rights system.

235.
Bockstiegel v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 97 P.3d 324 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), cert.
denied 2004 Colo. LEXIS 679 (Sept. 7, 2004).
236.
Id. at 328-29.
237.
McIntyre v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 86 P.3d 402 (Colo. 2004).
238.
Id. at 413-14.
239.
See Potter, supra note 14, at 496-98 (making the proposition that Colorado has implicitly recognized waterways as public highways).
240.
Colorado v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025 (1979).
241.
See supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text for discussion on how the majority in
Emmert relied on Colorado's constitution to support its holding.
242.
Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1028.
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In the 1998 case of Chatfield East Well Co., Ltd. v. Chatfield East
Property Owners, the public's constitutional right to water was given definite legal meaning.243 Chatfield expressly dispelled the belief that riparian
land was superior to the public's right to keep water in underground storage
in the name of the public. 2" In Chafield,a subdivision owner attempted to
deed land to a well company for the purpose of extracting groundwater."'
The court ruled that the deed did not vest any absolute interest in the water
below the property in question.246 The court held that "no person 'owns'
Colorado's public water resources as a result of land ownership."2 7 Thus,
this decision prioritized appropriative rights over public rights and public
rights over riparian rights. 2"
Overall, Chatfield implies that the constitutional public right is more
than an instrument of language.2 49 The constitutional public right was interpreted to vest a legally recognized right that goes beyond the mere right to
appropriate and is superioi to riparian landowner claims.25 With the holding
of Chatfield in place in Colorado, the same superior public right should be
recognized in the surface water context.
The Article 16, Section 5 public right to water was also interpreted
to confer broader meaning in the 1995 case of Aspen Wilderness Workshop
251
Aspen Wilderness Workshop
v. Colorado Water Conservation Board.
involved a suit brought by an environmental organization that challenged the
Colorado Water Conservation Board's (CWCB) decision not to enforce the
public's instream flow water right respecting a creek under a water court
decree.252 The Court found that "the Conservation Board has a unique statutory fiduciary duty to protect the public in the administration of its water
rights ....""' The court held that the CWCB breached its duty by not en-

243.

Chatfield East Well Co,, Ltd. v. Chatfield East Property Owners Ass'n, 956 P.2d

1260 (Colo. 1998).
244. Id.
Id. at 1264.
245.
Id. at 1268.
246.
Id. See also id.at 1267 ("All surface and ground water in Colorado is a public re247.
source.")

248.

See supra note 247 and accompanying text (implying a riparian right, incident to land

ownership is inferior to the public's right); Chatfield, 956 P.2d at 1271 (instructing the peti-

tioner to appropriate water by applying for a well permit with the state engineer if they so
desire to pump water and assert a claim that their right was superior to the public's right).
249. See Chatfield, 956 P.2d at 1268. The court extended the constitutional public right to
state waters to include not only "natural streams" but also "tributary groundwater." Id.(citing
CoLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5).
Id.
250.
Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d 1251
251.
(Colo. 1995).
Id. at 1253.
252.
Jdat 1260.
253.
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forcing water rights in the public's name.254 If the public's right to water, as
asserted in Emmert, only grants a right to appropriate through traditional
have a duty to
means such as irrigation, it makes no sense that CWCB would
25
enforce the modem public water right for instream flows.
Like the Chatfield decision, Aspen Workshop is representative of a
recent trend in Colorado law affording more meaning to the public right to
water as granted in Article 16, Section 5 of the Colorado Constitution. Although the modem cases do not expressly find the constitution to confer a
public right of access, they nonetheless show that the public right expressed
therein extends beyond traditional rights to irrigate.256 Colorado's modem
legal disposition toward affording more meaning to the public right is particularly relevant in determining a right of access, which was an integral
factor within the Emmert analysis. The Emmert opinion rested on the legislative disposition towards confining the public right to irrigation and other
traditional diversion needs.2" 7 If the law in Colorado should rest on the contemporary legislative disposition toward the public right, Emmert needs to
be revisited in order to better reflect the aforementioned modem trend.
The law in Emmert is also inconsistent with federal law. Together,
the seminal U.S. Supreme Court cases of United States v. Causby and Laird
v. Nelms long ago abandoned the ad coelum doctrine in federal jurisdictions." s Although Colorado law is not bound by federal law, the U.S. Supreme Court decisions on the ad coelum doctrine should have had a more
persuasive effect on the indecisive Emmert court. The 1946 Causby decision
may have merely raised doubts as to the modem day application of the ad
coelum doctrine, but the 1972 Laird decision went further by explicitly invalidating the doctrine in federal law.
The Causby Court found that a landowner's property interest is not
absolute, but must yield to certain modem realities such as air travel.2 5 9 Although the landowner in Causby in the end prevailed in their nuisance claim
against a neighboring municipal airport, the Court nonetheless prospectively
254.
Aspen Workshop, 901 P.2d at 1253 (citing section 37-92-102 of the Colorado water
code). See CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-102(3) (2004) (providing that all instream flow
rights appropriated by the CWCB are to be held in "behalf of the people of the state").
255.
See Colorado v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1028 (1979) (finding that Article 16, Section 5 of the Colorado Constitution "[w]as intended to preserve the historical appropriation
system of water rights upon which the irrigation economy in Colorado was founded").
256.
See supra notes 243-54 and accompanying text for discussion of the modem cases
that afford more meaning to the public right to waterways in Colorado, granted by the language of COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
257.
See supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text for discussion of the Emmert court's
reliance on the legislature's disposition towards limiting public rights of access.
258.
United States v. Causby, 66 S. Ct. 1062 (1946); Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972).
See also Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1033 (Carrigan, J., dissenting). Judge Carrigan cited Causby to
support his assertion that ad coelum should not apply to Emmert's case. Id.
259.
Causby, 66 S. Ct. at 1068.
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invalidated the ad coelum doctrine for the future.260 The Court concluded
'
that the Doctrine has "no place in the modem world."261
With dicta in the
chief opinion in Causby ending with this skeptical message, it appeared that
the landowners in Causby would be the last to advance a plausible ad coelum argument in a U.S. court.262
Almost thirty years later, Causby's skepticism of the doctrine was
affirmed in Laird v. Nelms.2 63 Laird involved a civil action under the Federal Tort Claims Act against a government military facility.2 4 Nelms, a private landowner, sought recovery for alleged damages to his house as a result
of sonic booms caused by a U.S. Air Force aircraft.2 65 The Court held that
the government was free of liability, finding high-altitude flights over land
do not constitute a trespass.2 66 The majority cited dicta from Causby in order
to support its holding, pointing out that the ancient ad coelum doctrine has
"no place in the modem world. 2 67 Thus, Laird fulfilled the prophecy laid
out in Causby by invalidating legal claims based on the archaic reasoning
from the ad coelum doctrine in the modem world.
In the water navigability context, there is no federal law that directly
addresses the ad coelum doctrine. However, the doctrine seems to have been
268
made obsolete with the U.S. Supreme Court decision of Kaiser Aetna.
Although the Kaiser Aetna Court held that the federal navigational servitude
constituted a Fifth Amendment taking of the plaintiff's land on the Hawaiian
Harbor, the opinion implied that the ad coelum concept is invalid for the
purpose of determining navigability in U.S. jurisdictions.269 Other courts in
following Kaiser Aetna have found instances where a federal navigational
servitude does not warrant compensation to private landowners.27 Thus, it
appears that the analysis established in Kaiser Aetna is open to the possibility that private land may be encumbered by a non-compensatory public ser-

260. Id. at 1066. The majority upheld the petitioner's nuisance claim, after finding that the
federal government's conduct rendered the claimant's property uninhabitable. Id.
261.
Id. at 1065.
262. Id.
263.
Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972).
264. Id. at 798-99.
265.
Id. at 797.
266. Id. at 800.
267. Id. at 799-800.
268. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
269. Id. at 175 (implying that private rights to ownership are not absolute). "Whether a
taking has occurred must take into consideration the important public interest in the flow of
interstate waters that in their natural condition are in fact capable of supporting public navigation." Id.
270. See, e.g., Loving v. Alexander, 548 F. Supp. 1079 (W.D. Va. 1982); see also Atlanta
Sch. of Kayaking, Inc. v. Douglasville-Douglas County Water & Sewer Auth., 981 F. Supp.
1469 (N.D. Ga. 1997). See supranote 41 for the holdings of these two cases.
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vitude. Such reasoning goes against the very definition upon which the ad
coelum doctrine derives its legitimacy.271
Although the above reasoning seems to further undercut the doctrine's validity, there are admittedly certain limitations to Kaiser Aetna's
legal effect on Emmert. The Supreme Court in Kaiser Aetna did not directly
address ad coelum in the same context as Emmert. The Kaiser Aetna decision involved a federal determination of navigability, which put title of the
beds and banks of the waterway at issue in a Fifth Amendments takings context.272 Emmert, on the other hand, involved a determination of whether
private title to beds and banks was subject to an easement by virtue of public
ownership of overlying waters.2 73 Due to this distinction in the facts, there is
274
no guiding federal authority over the decision made in Emmert.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the law in Emmert runs contrary to laws in neighboring intermountain states. Given a lack of state law
and of any persuasive federal authority on the issues addressed in Emmert,
the majority should have relied upon other state decisions for authority.275
The judicial decisions on access law in the neighboring states of New Mexico and Wyoming should have been addressed more fully by the Emmert
majority, since those state decisions were based on the same issues that the
Emmert court faced.276 First, like Colorado, the intermountain states of New
Mexico and Wyoming are both pure prior appropriation states that do not
recognize any rights to water based on the common law rule of riparianism." Second, New Mexico, Wyoming, and Colorado all have similar conSee Colorado v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027 (1979) (describing the common law
271.
rule of cujus est solum, ejus est usque adcoelum to hold that "he who owns the surface of the
ground has the exclusive right to everything which is above it").
272.
See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the Kaiser
Aetna decision.
See supra notes 186-92 and accompanying text for the factual background of Emmert.
273.
But see Madison v. Graham, 123 S. Ct. 2221 (2003). The Madison court denied a
274.
petition for writ of certiorari from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on the issue of
whether Montana's public servitude for access constituted a Fifth Amendment taking of private ownership of beds and banks. Id. If a definite public easement for access were established in Colorado and subsequently challenged under a takings claim at the federal level, it
would most likely fail. See Potter, supra note 14, at 498 for the assertion that that public
access opponents in Colorado ignore potential conflicts with federal and constitutional law.
See supra notes 243-56 and accompanying text for support of the proposition that
275.
although Colorado state law provides guidance, it does not directly address the question
raised in Emmert as to whether a definite public right of access is granted by the Colorado
Constitution.
See supranotes 54-77 and accompanying text for detailed discussion of New Mexico
276.
and Wyoming law on public access rights.
277.
New Mexico v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421, 430 (N.M. 1946) (stating that
the Colorado rule of pure prior appropriation is followed in New Mexico). Dale D. Goble,
PriorAppropriation and the Property Clause:A Dialogue of Accommodation, 71 OREGoN L.
REv. 381, 390-91 (1992) (implying that Wyoming law follows the "Colorado Rule" of pure
prior appropriation). The "Colorado Rule," established in Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co.,
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stitutional provisions that grant a public right to state waters.278 Finally, the
courts of all three states have heard cases involving a determination of
whether a public servitude exists on waterways that do not meet the federal
test for navigability. 279 Despite these overwhelming similarities, Colorado
stands in isolation as the only state out of28the
three that does not grant a
0
definite public servitude on state waterways.
In defining a narrow recreational easement, Emmert appropriately
looked for authority in the Wyoming case, Day v. Armstrong, but erroneously distinguished it.2 ' The majority in Emmert asserted that because the
Wyoming constitutional provision does not mention appropriation, the outcome of Day v. Armstrong doesn't apply to Colorado.2 2 This reasoning is
inherently flawed, since the public's undeniable right to appropriate is
granted within other provisions of the state constitution. 3 The Emmert majority failed to read Wyoming's constitutional provision on public rights to
water in conjunction with other pertinent state constitutional provisions.2l
Furthermore, Emmert avoided discussion of the New Mexico decision in
Red River Valley altogether.285 The decision in Red River Valley would
seem particularly important to the Emmert analysis, given that the 28New
6
Mexico opinion draws on Colorado law in order to arrive at its holding.
It has been argued by at least one scholar that because Colorado has
never applied the Public Trust Doctrine to water, there is no basis in Colo-

erases all vestiges of riparian common law by recognizing prior appropriation to have existed
in Western America, before statehood. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446
(1882).
278. See Potter, supra note 14, at 489-92 (comparing the constitutions of New Mexico,
Colorado, and Wyoming).
279. Colorado v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025 (1997); Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (1961);
New Mexico v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421 (N.M. 1946). See supra notes 54-77 and
accompanying text for discussion of the Red River Valley andDay cases.
280. See supra notes 221-26 and accompanying text for an illustration of the ambiguities
within the defined scope of Colorado's recreational easement.
281. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1028 (distinguishing the Colorado Constitution from Wyoming's). The majority compared the language in Wvo. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("The water of
all natural streams, springs, lakes or other collections of still water, within the boundaries of
the state, are hereby declared to be the property of the state.") with COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §
6 ("The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses shall
never be denied."). Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1028.
282. Id.
283. WYO. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (providing that "[n]o appropriation shall be denied except
when such denial is demanded by the public interests").
284. See Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1028 (discussing Wyoming law on recreational access
rights).
285. New Mexico v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421 (N.M. 1946); see Emmert, 597
P.2d at 1028 (failing to cite the New Mexico case in its discussion of other state authorities on
the issue).
286. See supranote 66 and accompanying text for support of this proposition.
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rado to grant stream access through a public servitude. 28 7 This assertion ignores the methods employed by the courts in New Mexico and Wyoming in
granting a public right of access. In the majority opinions of both Day and
Red River Valley there is no mention of the Public Trust Doctrine. 28 Rather,
both courts establish a public right of access solely from the language of the
state constitution and an analysis of the prior appropriation doctrine.289
As a final matter the access law in Colorado now stands contrary to
Montana's law. Although the Emmert court at the time it issued its decision
in 1979 was not able to look to Montana's access laws, which developed five
years later, Emmert should be revisited in order to reflect upon the recent
developments of its northern neighboring state.29 Like the other intermountain states, Montana has granted an affirmative public right of access from
the plain meaning of its state constitution.29' Colorado should follow Montana's lead in recognizing the law in Day in light of the fact that the Montana
Constitution also expressly grants a public right to state waterways that is
subject to appropriation.292 However, as the access laws stand today, the
introduction of Montana's access law only serves to pit Colorado's law further as the minority state in the intermountain west.
B.

Montana Law is Legally Grounded

In stark contrast to Colorado law, Montana's laws are consistent
with federal laws, with other laws in Montana, and most importantly with
287.
See Hill, supra note 4, at 341 for the argument that Colorado's rejection of the Public
Trust Doctrine should lead to a denial of a public servitude for recreationalists on Colorado
waterways.
288.
Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961). No mention of the words "public
trust" appear in the opinion. Id. Like Day, no mention of the words "public trust" appear in
the opinion of RedRiver Valley. Red River Valley, 182 P.2d at 421.
289.
See supra notes 54-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of Wyoming and New
Mexico access law and how an affirmative public right of access has been granted by the
language of state constitutions and the prior appropriation doctrine. Some scholars suggest
that the Public Trust Doctrine was also unnecessary for Montana to grant a public right to
access. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relevance of
the Public Trust Doctrine as it relates to the holding in Montana Coalition for Stream Access,
Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984).
See generally Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (establishing a definite right of access five years
290.
after Emmert delivered its decision).
291.
See supra notes 134-81 and accompanying text for a detailed look at Montana access
law, which interprets the plain meaning of its constitution to support state recognition of an
affirmative public right of access.
292.
See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text. Emmert distinguished the Wyoming
Day case after finding that the Wyoming Constitution did not grant a public right that was
subject to appropriation. See supra note 281 and accompanying text. However, Montana
followed the ruling in Day, despite the fact that the Montana Constitution mentions appropriation. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text; see also MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3
("[A]II surface, underground, flood, and atmospheric waters within the boundaries of the state
are the property of the state for the use of its people and are subject to appropriation .... ").
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other western state law on access. In providing a public right of access,
Montana uses a sound, plain-meaning method of interpretation that broadly
recognizes the "public right" to waterways.293 Montana not only established
a public right for recreational access on its waters, but also a public right for
the incidental contact associated with wading and emergency portages."l
The broad meaning afforded to the "public right" has also been
tested and affirmed at the federal level. 295 Furthermore, unlike Colorado's
law from Emmert, Montana law does not contradict federal law that seems to
have made the ad coelum argument long ago obsolete.296 In this regard,
Montana law runs a much lesser risk of being overturned or modified in the
future.
Montana's broad law on access is also supported by the state's related legislation, which also recognizes a public right to state waterways.
Specifically, the Montana water code includes public interest and public
instream flow laws that actively recognize and facilitate such a right.297 In
Montana's 1984 Water Use Act, the legislature amended its water code to
provide representation of public rights within its overall water allocation
scheme.2 ' 8 The legislature also authorized the Department of Fish, Wildlife,
and Parks to represent the public in establishing water rights for recreation.299 Under this authority, the Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks has
filed instream flow reservations on twelve of its "blue ribbon" streams for
the maintenance and preservation of flows for the public."l The 1984 legislative package also required that local public interests be factored before
issuing water rights permits.3"' The Department of Natural Resources and
Conservation is now required to consider any economic and environmental
factors, impacts, and benefits to the state before issuance." 2 Most signifi-

293.
See supra notes 134-81 and accompanying text for detailed discussion of Montana's
public access laws.
294.
See supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text for a list of the permissible incidental
uses that are verified by Montana law.
295.
See Madison v. Graham, 123 S. Ct. 2221 (2003) (denying petition for writ of certiorari on the issue of whether Montana's state determination of navigability constitute a governmental taking).
296.
See supra notes 258-71 and accompanying text for discussion of how federal law has
rejected the ad coelum doctrine.
297.
See generally MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 85-2-223, 85-2-316, 85-2-311 (LexisNexis
2004).
298.
See id. for the relevant provisions of Montana's Water Use Act.
299.
Id.§ 85-2-223 (2004).
300.
Id. § 85-2-316.
301.
Id. § 85-2-311. The Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation
along with local water judges (comprised within Montana's four water court divisions) were
given the authority of managing/issuing water permits. Id. This general adjudicative authority was granted after the passage of the Montana Water Use Act of 1984. Id
302.
Id.
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cantly, Montana's SAL
statute codifies all of Montana's case law on recrea30 3
tional access issues.

Perhaps more importantly, Montana's liberal law on access puts
Montana in line with the majority of western states that likewise recognize a
right of access. 3 4 Montana's access laws are particularly consistent with the
other intermountain, prior appropriation states of New Mexico and Wyoming."5 Like these two states, Montana has affirmatively afforded a right of
access through recognizing the Montana Constitution grants a general public
right to water." 6 Since there is no clear authority on the issue of whether a
state servitude for the public can be imposed upon private ownership of bed
and banks, consistency with other state access laws is an important measure
to legitimizing lawmaking." 7
C. Montana Law Creates BetterPolicy
Because water laws are primarily intended to conform to societal
needs, policy considerations play a major role in river access legislation in
the west.30 8 Policy considerations are particularly relevant to the making of
water laws, since water resources in America have been legally and historically recognized as a public form of property. 3 9 The legislative process that
determines recreational river access in the west should unfold in order to
best reflect societal stimuli and all the modem circumstances that drive it.3 10
303.

See supra notes 148-62 and accompanying text for a summary of Montana's SAL

statute.
304. See supra notes 54-77 and accompanying text for discussion of Wyoming and New
Mexico's recreational access laws.
305. See Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961) (granting a right of access over
waterways that do not meet the federal definition of navigability); State Game Comm'n v.
Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421 (N.M. 1946) (granting a right of access similar to Wyoming's).
306. See Mont. Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984)
(granting a public right to access in Montana).
307. See supra notes 243-57 and accompanying text for a closer look at other Colorado
laws that address the issue; see supra notes 268-74 and accompanying text for a closer look at
relevant federal law.
308.

See DAVID GETCHES, WATER LAW rN A NUTSHELL 3 (West Publishing Co. 1997)

(1984). Getches states that "[t]he law's success-in any field, but especially in water lawhas to be evaluated in terms of what society needs from it." Id.
309. See id at 11. The author states that "[w]ater is legally and historically a public resource," linking the historical development of the Public Trust Doctrine with the Navigability
law in America to support his assertion. Id.See also Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters
of the Public Trust: Some of the TraditionalDoctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425 (1989) (written as
part of the Symposium on the Public Trust and the Waters of the American West: Yesterday,
Today and Tomorrow held in New York City in 1989).
310.
GETCiW S, supra note 308, at 2-3. Getches describes water law as an illustration of
"[h]ow courts and legislatures create and alter law according to societal stimuli: one set of
historical conditions drove the initial development of water law but different modern circumstances provoke changes." Id. See also Bruce Babbit, The PublicInterest in Western Water,
23 ENVTL. L. 933, 937 (1993) ("[T]he [river access] issues have evolved way beyond owner-
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To meet this end, legislatures should strive to preserve the contemporary
common interest of the public and should do so notwithstanding any bureaucratic inefficiencies that may thwart the common needs of society.3" Thus,
good access law is backed by a policy that balances the underlying private
and public interests behind recreational access issues as if they were being
weighed by the people themselves.
Sound policy is particularly imperative in the intermountain west,
considering the many factors that will undoubtedly exacerbate water controversies that will affect future generations of westerners. An already scarce
supply of water in the region is certain to intensify with ensuing urban
growth.312 As water resources continue to be stretched in the arid west, the
values associated with public and private rights will rise to new heights of
concern. 313 In this respect, neither Colorado nor Montana will be afforded
the luxury of time, as both share almost identical drought conditions and
citizen demands of water. 14
Determining the aforementioned societal stimuli can be effectively
done by looking at the economies of the states making the laws.3 5 As menship issues and ought to be seen as a part of an effort to recapture the public interest in the
water resource.")311.
Frank J. Trelease, The Model Water Code, the Wise Administratorand the Goddam
Bureaucrat,14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 207 (1974). In this aptly titled article, western water guru
and former University of Wyoming School of Law Dean, Frank Trelease, stated:
The Wise Administrator, as every one knows, isthe man in a government
office who protects "the public interests" (read my interests) from actions
which would adversely affect those interests, when the public is (I am)
otherwise unable to influence the course of those actions. The other fellow is as easy to spot; he is the man in government who makes decisions
for me that I would rather, and could better, make for myself.
Id.at 207.
312.
See Kenneth D. Frederick & Peter H. Gleik, Water and Global Climate Change:
Potential Impacts on U.S. Water Resources 31-33 (1999), available at http://www.earthscape.org/pl/frkOl/frk0l.pdf (last visited May 1, 2005). Urban growth rates in the intermountain states are the highest in Colorado. U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000, States
Ranked by Percent Population Change: 1990 to 2000 (Apr. 2, 2001), available at
http://censusscope.org/us/rank_poplgrowth.html (last visited May 1, 2005). From 1990 to
2000 Colorado's population growth was more than two times greater than Montana's. Id.
313.
See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text for a summary of the climates and
competing demands for water in Montana and Colorado.
314.
See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text for a description of the arid nature of
Montana and Colorado's climates and citizen demand for water.
315.
Commentators on water law often turn to economics in order to develop recommendations on policy. See, e.g., Reed D. Benson, Recommendations for an Environmentally
Sound Federal Policy on Western Water, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 247, 262-63 (1998). To
evaluate federal water policies in the west, the author uses an economic analysis to weigh the
value of current allocated water uses in the west. Id See also Osboume, supra note 3, at 448.
The authors observe the evolution of access laws as a reflection of "[c]hanging historical,
cultural, and economic developments." Id
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tioned in the background of this comment, the overall economies in both
Colorado and Montana are highly influenced by recreationally based industries. 316
Without doubt, these recreational industries should continue to
thrive into the future if current public support for water-based recreational
activities has anything to do with it. In the 1990s, the number of out-of-state
fishing licenses sold in Montana increased dramatically, ranking sales in
Montana as the third highest among the fifty states.317 Likewise, there appears to be a growing appreciation for recreational opportunities in Colorado, as evidenced by the number of recreational water rights that are being
acquired by municipalities. 318 In-channel water rights have been decreed by
Colorado water courts and continue to be filed for numerous towns across
the state.319 Water rights for recreational uses are decreed for whitewater
parks that provide kayaking, tubing, and canoeing to promote local recreation and draw tourism.3 "° Awareness of recreational values has even reached
the political forum in Colorado. In a recent U.S. House of Representatives
meeting, Colorado Representative, Mark Udall, spoke of the importance of

See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text for an overview of the recreational
316.
economies in Colorado and Montana.
See supra note 127.
317.
In 1986, the city of Fort Collins, Colorado applied for two water rights on the Cache
318.
La Poudre River; one for fifty-five cfs for boating and piscatorial purposes and one for a
diversion from the Cache La Poudre River into the old channel to sustain habitat for a nature
center. Case No. 86CW371 (Water Division No. 1). Despite opposition from the City of
Thornton, these water rights were upheld in City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d
915 (Colo. 1992). Since the decision in City of Thornton, other Colorado municipalities have
obtained water decrees for recreational uses. See State Engineer v. City of Golden, 69 P.3d
1027 (Colo. 2003) (affirming water decrees for the City of Golden's whitewater park); State
Engineer v. Eagle River Water and Sanitation Dist., 69 P.3d 1028 (Colo. 2003) (affirming
water decrees for recreational water rights for whitewater parks in Breckenridge and Vail);
Case No. 94CW273 (Water Division No. 1) (decreeing 100 cfs for the City of Littleton's
boating course on the South Platte River). Applications for recreation water rights are pending approval from the CWCB for the cities of Pueblo, Steamboat Springs, Longmont, and
Gunnison. Colorado's Recreational In-Channel Diversion (RICD) Program: Pending RICD
Applications, available at http://www.cwcb.state.co.us/isf/rules/RICDapp.htm (last visited
May 1, 2005).
See supra note 318 and accompanying text for summary of decrees for in-channel
319.
water rights in Colorado. In 2001, the Colorado legislature passed Senate Bill 216, which
significantly changed the way rights for recreation purposes are currently appropriated in
Colorado. COLO. REV. STAr. § 37-92-103(4) (2004). The legislation provided that in-channel
recreational water rights may only be appropriated by local governmental entities and water
districts. Id. § 37-92-103(10.3). Senate Bill 216 also required that requested minimum stream
flows are "[d]iverted, captured, controlled, and placed to beneficial use between specific
points." Id. See also 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 408-3(p) (2004) (the CWCB's agency rules for
recreational in-channel diversions).
See Bruce Barcott, There's an Old Saying in Colorado: You Can Steal My Wife, But
320.
Not My Water, 2004-Aug LEGAL AF. 48 (2004) (summarizing the motivation and justification behind the City of Golden's recreational water right filing).
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recreation for youths and adults, emphasizing the value of recreation and
paddlesports on fitness.32'
In light of the above considerations, good policy behind the access
laws of Colorado and Montana should in theory reflect the current economic
and social values in river recreation. Nonetheless, the laws in place in these
states represent policies that stand in direct contradiction to each other.
Montana's liberal recreational servitude embraces public values by facilitating outdoor enthusiasts and recreation-based industries with uninterrupted
use of rivers and streams. In stark contrast, Colorado's narrowly defined
recreational servitude does not serve to support policy that would recognize
the economies and social values associated with water recreation. It serves
only to limit the necessary means by which river tourism may continue to
grow and by which river enthusiasts may exercise their passions and lifestyles.
IV. CONCLUSION

Montana's scope of the public's right is the clearest in the intermountain west, while Colorado's access law stands alone as the most ambiguous. Montana's liberal stream access statute provides a bright-line rule
for future recreational users and landowners to plan their affairs accordingly.
The Montana legislature has addressed important issues related to right of
portage and other incidental rights pursuant the public's constitutional right
to state water. 322 Because Montana's stream access statute leaves no gray
areas for misinterpretation, there is a low potential for future conflict. Thus,
Montana can rest assured that law enforcers and water users alike will have
statutory authority for the conduct they take before and after claims of trespass arise on state waters.
By contrast, in Colorado where recreational access law remains ambiguous, the potential for conflict is greatest. The Colorado Legislature has
not provided recreational users and landowners with a solid blueprint of law
to follow. There is no statutory law that defines when and where a private
landowner may fence off rivers and streams to public access, whether a right
of portage exists for recreational users, or if a private landowner has civil
recourse."' Not only does the current law in Colorado under Emmert fail to
comport with the laws of neighboring prior appropriation states, it also fails
as a matter of policy.

321.
Jason Robertson, PoliticalUpdate: BipartisanCongressional 'House Party, American Whitewater, January/February 2004.
322.
See supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text for a list of the permissible incidental
uses in Montana.
323.. See supra notes 221-24 and accompanying text for discussion of the ambiguities
found in Colorado's access law.
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Although the Colorado Attorney General attempted to address some
of these areas of law in a formal opinion, the legislature has failed to do the
same.1 4 The reason for this failure is not entirely clear. Perhaps it is due to
an unfounded fear that the Public Trust Doctrine may take hold and undermine Colorado's traditionally protected uses or maybe the legislature has
other complex political justifications.3 25 Regardless of why the legislature
avoids the issue, this provides little comfort to those who support public
policy to promote and perfect recreational use of the state's water resources.
Even beyond Montana, the recreational access laws found in the
neighboring intermountain states of Wyoming and New Mexico appear to be
on the right track. Although the access laws in both of these states may not
be as clear as Montana's law, they nonetheless provide a general right of
access on state waters that is upheld against criminal or civil claims of trespass.326 There remains some uncertainty in these states as to whether rights
of portage or wading are protected. However, Wyoming has begun to refine
its access law in regard to these areas of ambiguity. During the 2005 legislative session, a bill revising their current law to allow for more incidental uses
was proposed in the House and other bills like it have reached the capital
building in the past.327
Colorado lawmakers should follow the lead of the intermountain
states and pass legislation that affirmatively recognizes a public right of access. Perhaps the political change in the Colorado General Assembly following the 2004 elections may serve as a catalyst for much needed legislation.328 As asserted earlier, policy and law is on the side of such recognition,
but so is the logic of nature. Are the river beds and banks so inseparable
from the river itself? Perhaps Norman McClain answered this question best
in stating, "The river was cut by the world's great flood and runs over from
the basement of time. On some of the rocks are timeless3 29raindrops-under
the rocks are the words and some of the words are theirs.
TRAVIS H. BURNS

324.
See supra notes 207-14 and accompanying text for a summary of the Colorado Attorney General's opinion.
325.
See Lori Potter, The 1969 Act and Environmental Protection, 3 U. DENV. WATER L.
REV. 70, 77 (1999) (describing the public trust in Colorado as "The Two Little Words That
Can't Be Spoken").
See supra notes 54-77 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of Wyoming
326.
and New Mexico's public access laws.
327.
See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text for overview of Wyoming's proposed
legislation that addresses public access rights.
328.
Dennis Cauchon, Dems Gain in 'Hidden Election,'USA TODAY, Dec. 14, 2004, at 3A
(reporting that "[C]olorado democrats took control of both the House and Senate for the first
time since 1974.").
A River Runs Through It, Columbia/Tristar Studios, 1992.
329.
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